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CHAPTER 6 
THE COSTS OF GLOBAL TARIFF BARRIERS ON WOOL PRODUCTS 
 
6.1  Preamble 
  The current Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations commits WTO (World 
Trade Organization) members to improving market access for both agricultural and non-
agricultural goods (WTO 2001).  Tariff barriers on wool products (i.e., raw wool, wool 
textiles and garments) represent a small but important subset of these negotiations, 
particularly for countries that are major producers and/or exporters of wool products (e.g., 
Australia, New Zealand and China).  For these countries, understanding the effects of tariff 
barriers on wool products is of major interest.  The current (August 2006) state of play with 
the Doha round is that it has not reached a successful conclusion.  While the future of the 
round is somewhat uncertain, it is likely that the issue of agricultural trade reform will 
resurface in some form.  The analysis here will be of use for those future discussions.  
  To analyse the effects of wool tariff barriers, it is necessary to account for any special 
features of the world wool market that may impinge on the analysis.  What special features 
does the world wool market possess?  We have earlier identified that wool passes through 
an extreme form of multistage production system before it is consumed by households in 
the form of wool garments (see Chapter 3, Section 3.1.1); this is a unique feature of the 
wool production system.  Further, the regional pattern of output and exports at the primary 
end of the world wool market strongly diverges from the pattern of production and exports 
at the different production stages.  For instance, at the spinning (or yarn) and garment-
making stages the use of wool is concentrated in Western European countries (particularly 
Italy and the United Kingdom) and the Far East (particularly China).  At the retail stage   216
Germany and France, as well as Italy and the United Kingdom, are important Western 
European consumers of wool, and Japan, as well as China, is an important Far East 
consumer of wool (TWC 2002).   
  In order to inform the debate on the Doha round, we analyse the distortionary effects 
of recent and current tariff barriers on wool products using WOOLGEM (the model outlined 
in Chapter 3), which (i) acknowledges the diverse regional pattern of output and trade in 
wool products, (ii) recognises the heterogeneous nature of these products, (iii) recognises 
the linear hierarchy that exists in the multistage production system through which wool 
passes.  This is a comprehensive analytical approach with regard to the production, trade 
and consumption of wool products.  Further, we account for any indirect effects of wool 
tariff barriers on the nonwool economy as the model explicitly recognises the production, 
trade and consumption of nonwool products.  Also, the inclusion in the model of a cost-of-
capital function for each region accounts for long-run capital accumulation and captures the 
long-run effects of wool tariff barriers on regional investment.  Thus, the framework we 
apply is a comparative-static global general equilibrium model of trade and investment, 
with a detailed representation of the world wool market.  As such, the research extends 
current practice by combining the (typically) detailed partial equilibrium analysis of 
commodities with the economy-wide computable-general-equilibrium approach.   
  The model is applied to estimate the distortionary effects on prices, output, trade and 
regional welfare of wool tariff barriers.  The estimates are simulated under long-run 
conditions where each region faces a trade balance constraint and capital is free to 
accumulate or depreciate within each region.  But there is no inter-regional mobility of 
capital or labour.  Our experiments analyse the distortionary effects of tariff barriers from 
1997 to 2005, and from 2005 onwards.  The results are of value to policy makers, trade 
negotiators and producers, by aiding understanding of the global, regional and sectoral   217
implications of past and current wool tariff barriers.  The estimates are unprecedented in 
two respects.  One, to our knowledge, no previous estimates of the effects of wool tariff 
barriers on wool industries and regional producers exist.1  Two, the estimates are generated 
within a framework that captures the general interdependence between the wool and 
nonwool economies; this is also unprecedented.  Thus, the estimates represent a major 
contribution to modelling wool industries and wool tariff barriers.   
 
6.2  The nature of wool tariff barriers 
  Import duties on wool products represent an important input to this work.  Such 
duties for 1997 are taken from TWC (2003) and applied to the model database (see Chapter 
4, Section 4.3.2.1); table 6.1 presents average import tariffs in the model database after 
applying the wool tariff data.  We note that the global average tariff for all goods is 4.9%.  
China has the highest overall import tariffs at around 13%.  Taxes on imports of wool 
products are much higher than for nonwool products for all regions; the highest tariff 
averages for imports of wool products are for the USA (48%), China (28%), Australia and 
the ROW (32%).  Globally, import tariffs are lower for raw wool commodities (i.e., greasy, 
scoured and carbonised wools, worsted tops, and noils) compared to wool textiles (i.e., 
yarns and fabrics) and wool garments; for instance, the average tariff rate on greasy wool 
(5.8%) is only around one-fifth of the rate on wool garments (28.5%).   
                                              
1 There are many examples of studies analysing the global effects of trade barriers on broad classes of 
commodities and individual commodities.  This includes: general-equilibrium analysis of agriculture, 
manufacturing and services (Francois et al. 2005); general-equilibrium analysis of agriculture (Kilkenny 
and Robinson 1990); general-equilibrium analysis of industrial products (Fernandez de Cordoba et al. 
2005); general-equilibrium analysis of textiles and apparel (Trela and Whalley 1990); partial-equilibrium 
analysis of sugar (Elobeid and Beghin 2006); general-equilibrium analysis of sugar (Elbehri et al. 2000); 
partial-equilibrium analysis of wheat (Gomez-Plana and Devadoss 2004); partial-equilibrium analysis of 
rice (Sumner and Lee 2000); partial-equilibrium analysis of cotton (Pan et al. 2005).  Partial-equilibrium 
studies capture the direct effects of trade barriers upon the commodity/industry in question; general-
equilibrium studies capture the direct and indirect effects of trade barriers upon the commodity/industry in 
question.    218
Table 6.1  Average import tax rates in model database representing 1997 wool tariff 
barriers (per cent) 
 France  Germ  Italy  UK  USA  Japan  China  Aust  ROW  World 
 WOOL  PRODUCTS 
Greasy wool      0     0       0     0  20.4      0    9.0      0  11.0    5.8 
Scoured wool     0     0       0     0  20.4      0    9.0      0  11.0    4.9 
Carbon wool  1.9  1.6    2.0  1.2  11.8      0  10.0      0  21.0    2.3 
Worsted tops  1.9  1.6    1.4  0.9  11.8      0  10.0      0  21.0    1.9 
Noils  1.8  1.2    1.8  1.5  11.8      0  10.0      0  21.0    2.8 
Wool yarns  0.5  1.0    0.7  0.5    8.1   3.2  20.0   5.0  30.0  16.0 
Wool fabrics  0.3  0.4    1.6  0.8  68.1      0  35.0      0  34.5  25.4 
Wool garms  7.7  8.5  11.4  8.1 48.5 12.4 45.0 34.0 32.5 28.5 
Average  5.5  5.5    2.2  7.2 48.0 10.1 27.9 32.1 32.0 24.2 
 NONWOOL  PRODUCTS 
Sheep meat  5.5  13.3  7.0  18.6  1.1  149.1    2.1    0.2  20.4  16.4 
Synth textiles  4.3    5.3  5.0    5.3  8.8      8.1  25.0  13.9  10.1    9.7 
Other goods  1.4    1.7  1.4    2.1  2.3      6.9  13.0    3.5    5.9    4.7 
Average  1.4    1.8  1.4    2.2  2.4      6.9  13.3    3.7    6.0    4.8 
 ALL  PRODUCTS 
Average  1.5    1.8  1.5    2.2  2.8      6.9  13.4    3.8    6.1    4.9 
 
  One of the major aims of this work is to estimate the costs of recent (1997–2005) and 
current (2005) wool tariff barriers.  The costs of recent wool tariffs are a function of the 
movement in tariff barriers over the period; table 6.2 presents the movement (percentage 
change) in wool tariffs from 1997 to 2005.  These changes are based on 2005 wool tariffs 
sourced from TWC (2006) that have been mapped to the model database in the same way 
as 1997 wool tariffs.  We can see that, overall, there has been a significant reduction in 
global wool tariff barriers of 40% over this period.   
  On a broad commodity basis, the largest reductions have been in wool textiles (yarns, 
–66%; fabrics, –60%); nevertheless, scoured wool and wool garments (–36%) have also 
experienced large, but smaller, reductions.  Note also that the reductions in wool tariff 
barriers for the period 1997–2005 have contributed to a reduction in the global tariff 
average on all goods of 1.5%.  Thus, despite wool commodities representing a small share 
of world trade, they have still made a small but observable contribution to overall tariff 
reductions during the period.  
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Table 6.2  Percentage change in average import tax rates, 1997–2005 
 France  Germ  Italy  UK  USA  Japan  China  Aust  ROW  World 
 WOOL  PRODUCTS 
Greasy wools   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -8.3  0.0  116.7  0.0  -89.4 22.5 
Scourd  wools  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -8.3  0.0  116.7  0.0  -89.4  -36.1 
Carbon  wools 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -41.5  0.0 105.0  0.0 -82.5  2.7 
Worsted  tops  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -41.5  0.0 105.0  0.0 -82.5 -14.2 
Noils  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  -41.5 0.0  105.0 0.0  -82.5  -19.2 
Wool  yarns  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  -25.9 -15.6 -75.0  0.0 -66.4 -65.8 
Wool  fabrics  -34.7 -34.7 -34.7 -34.7 -63.3  0.0 -71.4  0.0 -57.5 -60.3 
Wool  garms  -11.0 -11.0 -10.9 -11.1 -48.7 -14.3 -64.9 -48.5 -25.4 -35.9 
Average -10.9  -10.8  -9.3  -11.2  -49.0 -14.4 -56.2 -48.4 -37.2 -40.4 
 ALL  PRODUCTS 
Average  -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 -0.3 -8.0 -0.2 -1.1 -2.0 -1.0 -1.5 
 
  We observe a 22% increase in global average tariffs on greasy wools and a 3% 
increase on carbonised wools.  The increases are driven purely by a doubling of the tariffs 
we apply for raw wool imported by China.  This reflects a doubling of the out-of-quota 
tariff, from 15% to 38%, while the in-quota tariff has fallen: from 3% to 1% for greasy 
wools and from 5% to 3% for wool top.  Based on assessments by Read (2004) and van 
Rooyen (2006), it seems reasonable to assume that the out-of-quota tariff does not often 
apply.  Consequently, we assume in our simulations for the 1997–2005 period that the 1997 
tariffs on raw wool applied by China remain unchanged.2  
  Four regions have enormously reduced tariff barriers over the period as reflected by 
average wool tariffs; the USA (–49%), China (–56%), Australia (–48%) and the ROW 
region (–37%).  Much smaller reductions in average wool tariffs, in the order of 10%, have 
also occurred in all other regions.  We note that the composite ROW region shows some of 
the largest individual reductions in wool tariffs, particularly on raw wool (80–90%).  Given 
the size of these changes, it would be ideal for this region to be more disaggregated into the 
developing regions that have significantly reduced wool tariffs over this period.3  
                                              
2 The model database also captures the distortions of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) by 
including export tax equivalents of ATC quotas in place at 1997.  These distortions are also left untouched 
in the simulations.   
3 Tariff data from TWC (2006) indicates that almost all of the reduction in ROW wool tariffs is driven by 
reductions in India.     220
Unfortunately, our source data for wool commodities, industries and regions do not allow 
for a further disaggregation.  Despite this constraint, this work represents a significant 
advancement when placed in the context of the absence of previous work in this area.   
  In estimating the costs of 2005 tariff barriers we will assume complete removal of 
tariffs in place at that time.  This provides a benchmark scenario for policy makers, trade 
negotiators and producers with which to place wool tariff barriers in the context of broader 
negotiations on trade barriers for all goods.  For the purposes of comparison, table 6.3 
presents average wool tariffs for both 1997 and 2005.   
 
Table 6.3  Average import tax rates, 1997 and 2005 (per cent) 
 France  Germ  Italy  UK  USA  Japan  China  Aust  ROW  World 
 WOOL  PRODUCTS: 1997 
Greasy wools      0     0       0     0  20.4      0    9.0      0  11.0    5.8 
Scourd wools     0     0       0     0  20.4      0    9.0      0  11.0    4.9 
Carbon wools  1.9  1.6    2.0  1.2  11.8      0  10.0      0  21.0    2.3 
Worsted tops  1.9  1.6    1.4  0.9  11.8      0  10.0      0  21.0    1.9 
Noils  1.8  1.2    1.8  1.5  11.8      0  10.0      0  21.0    2.8 
Wool yarns  0.5  1.0    0.7  0.5    8.1   3.2  20.0   5.0  30.0  16.0 
Wool fabrics  0.3  0.4    1.6  0.8  68.1      0  35.0      0  34.5  25.4 
Wool garms  7.7  8.5  11.4  8.1 48.5 12.4 45.0 34.0 32.5 28.5 
Average  5.5  5.5    2.2  7.2 48.0 10.1 27.9 32.1 32.0 24.2 
 WOOL  PRODUCTS: 2005 
Greasy  wools   0 0 0 0  18.7 0  19.5 0  1.2  7.2 
Scourd  wools  0 0 0 0  18.7 0  19.5 0  1.2  3.2 
Carbon  wools 1.9 1.6 2.0 1.2 6.9  0  20.5  0 3.7 2.4 
Worsted  tops  1.9 1.6 1.4 0.9 6.9  0  20.5  0 3.7 1.7 
Noils  1.8 1.2 1.8 1.5 6.9  0  20.5  0 3.7 2.2 
Wool  yarns  0.5 1.0 0.7 0.5 6.0 2.7 5.0 5.0  10.1 5.5 
Wool  fabrics  0.2 0.3 1.1  0.5 25.0  0 10.0  0 14.7 10.1 
Wool garms  6.8  7.6  10.1  7.2 24.9 10.6 15.8 17.5 24.2 18.3 
Average  4.9 4.9 2.0 6.4 24.5  8.7 12.2 16.5 20.1 14.4 
 ALL  PRODUCTS 
1997  1.5    1.8  1.5    2.2  2.8      6.9  13.4    3.8    6.1    4.9 
2005  1.4 1.8 1.5 2.2 2.6 6.9  13.3 3.7 6.1 4.8 
 
  The most marked difference between pre-2005 and 2005 tariffs is the reduction in 
dispersion across production stages; for instance, the average tariff rate on greasy wool was 
only one-fifth of the rate on wool garments in 1997, whereas this ratio is just over one-third 
in 2005.  This represents a significant reduction in dispersion and overall tariff levels given 
that the global average tariff on wool garments has fallen from 29% in 1997 to 18% in   221
2005.  In general, tariffs on raw wool (i.e., greasy, scoured and carbonised wools, worsted 
tops, and noils) have fallen slightly from already low levels in 1997, while tariffs on wool 
textiles (i.e., yarns and fabrics) and garments have fallen significantly from high levels in 
1997.  Consistent with this, the highest individual tariff barrier has fallen from 68% to 25% 
(wool fabrics in the USA).  The general pattern in global wool tariffs is reflective of tariff 
changes for all regions.  Despite these reductions, significant average tariff barriers remain 
in the USA (25%), ROW (20%), Australia (17%) and China (12%), which suggests 
significant remaining costs from wool tariffs.  
 
6.3  The costs of wool tariff barriers between 1997 and 2005 
  We simulate the changes in wool tariffs between 1997 and 2005 and analyse the 
changes on macroeconomic and microeconomic variables. 
 
6.3.1  Macroeconomic effects 
  For a given region, there are two potential initial effects of the tariff reductions.  First, 
the tariff reductions reduce the price of imported wool products; wool industries will 
substitute imported wool products for domestic wool products and, ceteris paribus, 
domestic wool industries will contract.  Contracting domestic wool industries will reduce 
their demand for all inputs; thus, the demand for domestic nonwool inputs will fall and this 
will cause domestic nonwool industries to contract.  Contracting wool and nonwool 
industries will reduce their overall demand for primary factors.  Lower demand for primary 
factors will benefit the fixed factors, i.e., land and labour, and will disadvantage the 
variable factor, i.e., capital.  Thus, the relative price of capital will increase causing 
industries to substitute land and labour for capital.  The size of this initial effect is indicated 
by the percentage change in the average indirect tax rate due to the tariff reductions   222
weighted by the share of the indirect taxes in GDP (table 6.4, row 1); thus, the initial effect 
is smallest in the European regions and Japan and largest in the USA, China, Australia and 
the ROW.  The small size of these changes indicates that the economy-wide effect of 
cheaper wool products should not be large.   
 
Table 6.4  Macroeconomic effects of changes in wool tariff barriers, 1997–2005 
(percentage change) 
 France  Germ  Italy  UK  USA  Japan  China  Aust  ROW  World 
1. Ind tax ratea  -0.0013 -0.0019 -0.0007 -0.0018 -0.0279 -0.0013 -0.0451 -0.0144 -0.0204   
2. Export tariffb    -0.1818 -0.6521 -2.4015 -0.1409 -0.0158 -0.0299 -0.5856 -0.1229 -0.4975   
3. Real GDP  -0.0012 -0.0003  0.0654  0.0062 -0.0152 -0.0007  0.0615 -0.0290 -0.0029 -0.0012 
4. Value added  -0.0045  -0.0055  0.0549  0.0034  -0.0326  -0.0019  -0.0001  -0.0316  -0.0150  -0.0137 
5. Capital stock  -0.0091 -0.0125  0.1020  0.0095 -0.0870 -0.0049 -0.0002 -0.0704 -0.0333 -0.0327 
6. Ind tax basec  0.0203 0.0447 0.1742 0.0438 0.4982 0.0065 0.3438  -0.0054 0.1083 0.1268 
a Indirect tax rate weighted by share of indirect taxes in GDP.  b Tariff rate faced by exports weighted by share of exports 
in GDP.  c This is qnit in equation (6.1); see text for explanation.   
 
  The second (potential) initial effect of the tariff reductions for a given region is 
increased demand for exports of wool products.  Substitution of cheaper imported wool 
products for domestic wool products will favour regions from which the imported wool 
products are sourced.  Increased demand for exports of wool products will cause domestic 
wool industries (in the exporting regions) to expand.  Expanding domestic wool industries 
will increase their demand for all inputs; thus, the demand for domestic nonwool inputs will 
rise and this will cause domestic nonwool industries to expand.  Ceteris paribus, expanding 
wool and nonwool industries will increase the overall demand for primary factors.  Higher 
demand for primary factors will benefit the variable factor, i.e., capital, and will 
disadvantage the fixed factors, i.e., land and labour.  Thus, the relative price of capital will 
fall causing industries to substitute capital for land and labour.  A measure of the size of 
this effect is the percentage change in the average tariff barrier faced by exports weighted 
by the share of exports in GDP (table 6.4, row 2).     223
  This measure indicates that, ceteris paribus, Italy is expected to experience far and 
away the strongest increase in export demand and this is because of the large share (5%) 
that wool textiles and garments comprise in total exports; wool textiles and garments 
experience far and away the largest reductions in global tariff barriers over 1997–2005.  
Germany, China and the ROW are expected to experience less significant increases in 
export demand as the export shares for wool textiles and garments are somewhat smaller 
than Italy’s – 0.8%, 2.1% and 0.5% – but still much larger than in other regions.  The 
pattern of exports also explain why Australia is expected to experience only a small 
increase in exports; its exports are heavily skewed towards raw wool and these products 
experience the smallest reductions in global tariff barriers over the period.   
  The relative sizes of the two initial effects will largely determine the size of the 
effects on economic activity in a given region (real GDP; table 6.4, row 3).  The largest 
positive effects on real GDP are observed in Italy (0.065%) and China (0.062%); both of 
which experience large reductions in the tariff barriers faced by their exports (row 2).  The 
UK is the only other region to experience a real GDP increase (0.006%).  All other regions 
experience lower real GDP.  The largest reductions are in Australia (–0.029%) and the USA 
(–0.015%); both are regions that experience relatively large increases in import demand (as 
measured by row 1) and relatively small increases in export demand (as measured by row 
2).   
  The observed changes in real GDP will not be fully explained by our stylised 
explanation for how the tariff reductions determine which regions will gain and which will 
lose.  In the long-run closure of WOOLGEM, the regional land and labour quantities are 
exogenous and their respective prices are endogenous, whereas regional capital stocks are 
endogenous and rates of return are exogenous (see Chapter 3, Section 3.17.2).  Thus, to the   224
extent that a region’s capital stock changes due to the tariff shocks, real GDP will diverge 
from our stylised explanation.   
  Formally, we can define the percentage change in real GDP (qgdp) from the income 
side as a function of the change in the use of resources in the economy and/or the change in 
the efficiency with which resources are used in the economy, i.e.,  
  qgdp SVAqva SNITqnit =+ ; (6.1) 
where qva and qnit are the percentage changes in real value added and the quantity base 
upon which net (of subsidies) indirect taxes are levied, and SVA and SNIT are the shares of 
value added and net indirect taxes in GDP.   
  qva measures the change in the use of resources; as only capital is variable in the long 
run, any change in qva will be due to a change in the use of capital.  The tariff changes 
cause qva to fall in most regions (table 6.4, row 4) and this is due to a fall in the use of 
capital (row 5).  The changes in qva explain why qgdp expands in Italy and the UK − both 
experience an increase in the use of capital – and why qgdp falls in most other regions − 
where capital usage falls.  But for China qva hardly changes but qgdp still increases.  To 
explain this result we need to explain qnit (row 6).  
  qnit in (6.1) measures the change in the efficiency with which resources are used in 
the economy.  This can happen via a change in tax rates (e.g., tariffs) and/or a change in the 
tax bases.  Tax bases can change via price or quantity movements.  The model distinguishes 
many indirect taxes (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4.5).  qnit is defined as 
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where the SNs represent shares in total net indirect taxes and the qs represent percentage-
change quantity variables.  That is, qnit is defined in terms of the changes in all tax bases 
attributable to changes in quantities only.  Reading across the right-hand side of (6.2), the 
tax bases are: output by the J industries; the 3 factors used by the J industries; the K 
intermediate inputs from different sources (domestic, imported) used by the J industries; 
inputs to investment, household and government consumption; and exports and imports.   
  Where the composition of sectoral outputs and sales do not change, all the qs in (6.2) 
will move together.  In this case, qnit and qva in (6.1) will also move together, as qnit is the 
weighted sum of sales and qva is the weighted sum of (net) industry outputs.  But the tariff 
changes will induce a change in each economy’s production and sales structure; if the 
changes favour industries that are relatively highly taxed, qnit  will be positive, if the 
changes favour industries that are relatively lightly taxed (or subsidised), qnit  will be 
negative.   
  The compositional changes cause qva and qnit to diverge in all regions (cf. rows 4 
and 6).  Where qgdp exceeds qva, the excess represents the allocative efficiency gains from 
changing the composition of the economy in favour of activities that were discouraged 
(relative to optimum) in the pre-shock tax regime.  This is what occurs in Italy, the UK and 
China; for China, all of the increase in qgdp is due to allocative efficiency gains, whereas 
for Italy and the UK the allocative efficiency gains are the dominant contributor to the gain 
in qgdp.  Where qgdp falls but qnit rises, this is due to allocative efficiency gains reducing 
the negative impact of a fall in qva.  This is what occurs in France, Germany, the USA, 
Japan and the ROW.  Australia is unique in that it experiences an allocative efficiency loss; 
the tariff changes lead to compositional changes that favour activities that were encouraged 
(relative to optimum) in the pre-shock tax regime.  This is explained more in the section on 
microeconomic effects.     226
6.3.1.1  The capital stock response  
  The tariff reductions cause differential effects upon regional capital stocks (table 6.5, 
row 1).  The effects reflect what happens to the relative cost of capital as a response to the 
tariff reductions (row 2c).  We see that the capital stock shrinks everywhere where the 
relative price of capital rises, which is most regions, and expands in Italy and the UK where 
the relative price of capital falls.  Why do the relative prices of capital respond in this way?  
As explained earlier, one of the initial effects of the tariff changes is a contraction in 
domestic industries (due to substitution of imported wool products for domestic wool 
products) that, in turn, reduces the demand for primary factors in the economy.  This will 
favour the fixed factors (land and labour) and discriminate against the variable factor 
(capital); the relative price of capital will rise and industries will substitute land and labour 
for capital.   
 
Table 6.5  Effects on regional capital stocks and relative primary factor prices of 
changes in wool tariff barriers, 1997–2005 (percentage change) 
 France  Germ  Italy  UK  USA  Japan  China  Aust  ROW  World 
1. Capital stock  -0.0091 -0.0125  0.1020  0.0095 -0.0870 -0.0049 -0.0002 -0.0704 -0.0333 -0.0327 
2.  Relative  prices            
2a. Landa  0.0287 0.0168 0.0278 0.0068  -0.0121 0.0034  -0.0401  -0.3764  -0.0429  -0.0250 
2b. Laboura  -0.0050 -0.0035  0.0435  0.0026 -0.0228 -0.0016  0.0046 -0.0127 -0.0138 -0.0133 
2c. Capitala  0.0047 0.0043  -0.0366  -0.0049 0.0378 0.0024 0.0012 0.0331 0.0194 0.0190 
a These are relative prices, i.e., the price of the primary factor deflated by the average price of all primary factors.  Here 
all prices are purchaser’s prices.   
 
  One way that the above-described initial effect on the relative price of capital might 
be offset is if the tariff reductions reduce the cost of creating capital (investment).  As the 
rate of return is held fixed in the long run, a fall in the price of investment will in turn drive 
down the rental price of capital.  Such an effect would work to offset the initial rise in the 
relative price of capital.  But wool inputs are clearly not an important input to investment.  
In fact, the model database indicates that close to 100% of inputs to investment are made up   227
of other (nonwool) goods.  Thus, other reason cause the relative price of capital to fall in 
Italy and the UK.  
  Another initial effect of the tariff changes is to increase demand for a region’s exports 
where tariff barriers faced by those exports are lowered.  Domestic industries (in the 
exporting region) will expand in response to increased export demand.  In general, 
expanding domestic industries will increase the demand for primary factors in the 
economy.  Ceteris paribus, this will favour the variable factor (capital) and discriminate 
against the fixed factors (land and capital); the relative price of capital will fall and 
industries will substitute capital for land and labour.   
  Each region thus faces two countervailing effects on the general demand for primary 
factors; a contractionary effect from cheaper imports and an expansionary effect from 
increased export demand.  If the contractionary effect is not fully offset by the 
expansionary effect, the relative price of capital will rise and the capital stock will shrink; 
this is what happens in most regions.  If the contractionary effect is more than offset by the 
expansionary effect, the relative price of capital will fall and the capital stock will expand; 
this is what happens in Italy and the UK. 
 
6.3.1.2  The trade response  
  The changes in wool tariffs lead to increased imports in all regions (table 6.6, row 2).  
In the long run, the trade balance to GDP ratio is assumed fixed in all regions.  Thus, a rise 
in imports must be offset by a rise in exports (row 1).  The more that the terms of trade 
improve (row 3), the less that exports must rise to maintain the trade balance to GDP ratio.  
The terms of trade improve the most for Italy (0.094%) and Australia (0.104%). Thus, for 
Italy exports rise by less than imports (0.43% versus 0.57%) due to its terms of trade 
improvement; this is what happens in most regions that experience a terms of trade gain.    228
Australia’s terms of trade improvement is so strong and its increase in imports (0.036%) so 
small that its exports are able to fall (–0.083%) and still maintain the initial trade balance to 
GDP ratio.  The terms of trade deteriorate for the USA (–0.036%) and the ROW (–
0.016%); thus exports rise by more than imports: 0.193% versus 0.122% in the USA and 
0.136% versus 0.125% in the ROW.   
 
Table 6.6  Regional trade effects of changes in wool tariff barriers, 1997–2005 
(percentage change) 
 France  Germ  Italy  UK  USA  Japan  China  Aust  ROW 
1.  Exports  0.005 0.010 0.430 0.013 0.193 0.058 0.777  -0.083 0.136 
2. Imports  0.029  0.054  0.569  0.046 0.122 0.081 0.859 0.036 0.125 
3. Terms of trade  0.023  0.043  0.094 0.033  -0.036 0.010 0.000 0.104  -0.016 
3a. Export price  0.053  0.067  0.170  0.058  -0.016 0.026 0.023 0.128 0.018 
3b. Import price   0.030  0.025  0.076 0.025 0.020 0.016 0.022 0.025 0.034 
4. Export tariffa  -0.182 -0.652 -2.402 -0.141 -0.016 -0.030 -0.586 -0.037 -0.492 
5.  GNE  0.005 0.011 0.094 0.015  -0.018 0.000 0.064  -0.004  -0.003 
6. GNE in export 
destinationsb  0.009 0.006 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.003 -0.003  0.005  0.003 
7. Price of value 
added   0.049 0.063 0.146 0.063  -0.009 0.025 0.129 0.043 0.045 
a Tariff rate faced by exports weighted by share of exports in GDP.  b For a given region, this is GNE in export 
destinations weighted by export shares.  
 
  Import prices rise in all regions (row 3b, table 6.6) due to substitution of cheaper 
imported goods for domestic goods but the variation in import prices across regions is 
small; that is, from 0.016% (Japan) to 0.076% (Italy).  Export prices also rise in all regions 
(row 3a, table 6.6) except the USA (–0.016%).  For all other regions the variation in export 
prices is larger than that observed for import prices; that is, from 0.018% (ROW) to 0.17% 
(Italy).  Thus, the differences in terms of trade changes across regions are largely due to the 
differences in the prices of exports.   
  The differences in export prices partly reflect the degree to which demand expands 
for the exports of each region.  This is largely a function of the degree to which tariff 
barriers faced by each region fall (row 4, table 6.6); Germany, Italy, China and the ROW 
experience the largest such reductions.  The differences in export prices also partly reflect   229
the degree to which demand conditions (GNE; row 5) in a region’s export destinations (row 
6) interact with lower domestic costs (row 7) in the exporting region.  The USA’s export 
prices fall due to the marginal reduction in tariff barriers faced by its exports and lower 
domestic costs.  For China, the weak export price rise (0.023%) reflects a strong trade 
orientation with the USA and the ROW, both of which experience a reduction in GNE (–
0.018% and –0.003%), offsetting the relatively large reduction in barriers faced by its 
exports and higher domestic costs (0.129%).  Australia experiences the second largest 
export price rise (0.128%) even though its export barriers fall only marginally; it benefits 
from a relatively large rise in GNE in export destinations (0.005%) due to a strong trade 
orientation with Italy and China, which experience the largest increases in GNE (0.094% 
and 0.064%), and higher domestic costs (0.043%). 
 
6.3.1.3  Welfare effects 
  The welfare effects of the tariff changes, as measured by real household income (row 
5, table 6.7), are largely inconsistent with the real GDP effects (row 6); welfare rises in all 
regions except the USA, Australia and ROW.4  For the USA and the ROW, the size of the 
welfare effects (–0.016% and –0.005%) are consistent with size of the real GDP effects (–
0.015% and –0.003%).  For Australia, the welfare loss (–0.04%) exceeds the fall in real 
GDP (–0.029%).  Here, there is a relatively large rise in the income tax rate (row 2; 
0.155%) reflecting the fall in allocative efficiency due to the tariff changes (see row 6, table 
6.4).  Thus, relatively lightly-taxed (or subsidised) activities expand due to the tariff 
changes placing pressure on government revenues.  The government budget position is 
fixed in the long run (see Chapter 3, Section 3.17.2); therefore any pressure on  government  
                                              
4 Real household income is a metric of the change in the Hicksian equivalent variation.     230
revenue is accommodated by the income tax rate adjusting upwards.  The rise in the income 
tax rate is large enough to reduce nominal household disposable income (row 3, –0.019%); 
this is magnified by a small rise in the consumer price index (row 4; 0.021%) thus causing 
real household income to fall by –0.04%. 
 
Table 6.7  Regional welfare effects due to changes in wool tariff barriers, 1997–2005 
(percentage change) 
 France  Germ  Italy  UK  USA  Japan  China  Aust  ROW 
1. Factor incomea 0.045 0.057 0.201 0.067  -0.042 0.024 0.129 0.011 0.030 
1a. Land inca    0.059 0.071 0.167 0.067  -0.017 0.029 0.089  -0.375 0.003 
1b. Labour inca  0.044 0.059 0.189 0.066  -0.032 0.024 0.134 0.031 0.031 
1c. Capital inca  0.045 0.055 0.211 0.068  -0.058 0.023 0.130 0.006 0.031 
2. Income tax rate  0.011  0.012  -0.031 0.008 0.125 0.012 1.870 0.155 0.142 
3. Disp incomeb  0.040 0.048 0.213 0.065  -0.074 0.022 0.096  -0.019 0.007 
4.  CPI  0.040 0.045 0.119 0.048  -0.058 0.021 0.004 0.021 0.012 
5. Real incomec  0.000 0.003 0.094 0.017  -0.016 0.002 0.092  -0.040  -0.005 
5a. US$ million  3  36  672  165  -982  53  689  -123  -366 
6. Real GDP  -0.001  -0.000  0.065  0.006 -0.015 -0.001  0.062 -0.029 -0.003 
a These are pre-tax nominal variables.  b This is post-tax nominal household factor income. c This is post-tax nominal 
household factor income (row 3) minus the consumer price index (row 4). 
 
  For Italy, the UK and China, the positive welfare effects are consistent with the 
positive real GDP effects.  France, Germany and Japan all experience marginal reductions 
in real GDP and marginal increases in real income.  In these regions, the allocative 
efficiency gains are favourable enough so that the replacement of indirect tax revenue with 
direct tax revenue is only slight; thus, income tax rates rise by much less than factor 
incomes.   
  In summary, Italy (0.094%), China (0.092%) and the UK (0.017%) are the largest 
gainers from the movement in wool tariffs between 1997 and 2005; these gains are worth 
approximately $672, $689 and $165 million annually in 1997 US dollars.   
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6.3.2  Microeconomic effects 
  The response of a given industry’s output to the tariff changes will be largely 
determined by the interaction of three forces.  One, the degree to which the price of 
competing imports falls due to lower tariffs [panel (a), table 6.8].  Two, the degree to which 
the tariff barriers it faces in export markets fall [panel (b)].  Three, the effect on the relative 
price of the primary factor that it uses most intensively [panel (c)].  Comparing the 
magnitude of the three forces as reported in table 6.8, the size of the first two dominates the 
size of the changes in the third.  Thus, we expect the first two effects to largely determine 
the changes in each industry’s output.   
 
Table 6.8  Changes in import tariffs, export barriers and relative primary factor 
prices due to changes in tariff barriers, 1997–2005 (percentage change) 
 France  Germ  Italy  UK  USA  Japan  China  Aust  ROW 
  (a) Import tax rates 
Greasy wools   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0  -89.4 
Scoured  wools  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  -8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0  -89.4 
Carbon  wools  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  -41.5 0.0 0.0 0.0  -82.5 
Worsted  tops  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  -41.5 0.0 0.0 0.0  -82.5 
Noils  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  -41.5 0.0 0.0 0.0  -82.5 
Wool  yarns  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  -25.9 -15.6 -75.0  0.0 -66.4 
Wool  fabrics  -34.7 -34.7 -34.7 -34.7 -63.3  0.0 -71.4  0.0 -57.5 
Wool  garms  -11.0 -11.0 -10.9 -11.1 -48.7 -14.3 -64.9 -48.5 -25.4 
  (b) Import tax rates faced by exports 
Greasy  wools    0 0  -5.84 0 0 0  -50.68  -32.92  -11.98 
Scoured wools  -13.98  -89.36  -7.54  0  0  0 -70.32 -57.65 -18.17 
Carbon wools  0  0  -33.95  0  -0.01  0.02 -8.81 -4.34  -14.68 
Worsted  tops  -80.06 -76.73 -82.54 -73.93  -4.49  -7.92 -37.83 -18.03 -10.88 
Noils  -42.07 -41.52 -41.29 -41.05  0.00 -0.02  -23.84 -1.23  -29.29 
Wool  yarns  -66.82 -67.07 -68.03  -66.87 0 0  -59.71 0  -59.34 
Wool  fabrics  -58.66 -58.57 -60.61 -59.51 -58.50 -67.65 -57.36  0 -60.94 
Wool  garms  -26.40 -25.85 -29.75 -27.56 -22.23 -53.12 -28.37 -35.69 -40.88 
  (c) Relative price of primary factorsa 
Land  0.0287 0.0168 0.0278 0.0068  -0.0121  0.0034 -0.0401 -0.3764 -0.0429 
Labour  -0.0050 -0.0035  0.0435  0.0026 -0.0228 -0.0016  0.0046 -0.0127 -0.0138 
Capital 0.0047  0.0043  -0.0366  -0.0049 0.0378 0.0024 0.0012 0.0331 0.0194 
a The price of the primary factor deflated by the average price of all primary factors.   
 
  In presenting industry and commodity results we aggregate the 56 commodities and 
43 industries to 11 broad commodity and 8 broad industry classes in order to keep the 
discussion of the results manageable.  Table 6.9 reports various commodity and industry   232
results of the wool tariff changes.  In most regions the distortionary price effects [panel (a)] 
of the tariff barriers are generally not large; for most wool commodities the tariffs have 
inflated prices in the order of 5–10%; the exception is noils where prices are estimated to 
fall by 21% in the USA and rise by 27% in Germany.  The large price fluctuations for noils 
reflect its joint product characteristics in the production of worsted tops; thus, the supply 
curve for noils is quite steep and any changes in demand will cause large price fluctuations.  
The largest across-the-board price reductions are experienced in the USA and the ROW, 
which are the only regions to reduce wool tariffs across-the-board [see panel (a), table 6.8].  
Tariffs on wool fabrics and garments are reduced significantly in all regions, but significant 
price reductions for these products only occur in regions where tariffs are reduced from a 
high initial rate, i.e., the USA, China and the ROW.   
  The changes in industry output due to the tariff changes [panel (b), table 6.9,] are 
extreme and divergent reflecting the discriminatory nature of tariffs over this period.  For 
instance, the output of carbonised wools in France doubles (101%) whereas in the USA it 
more than halves (–72%).  Other extreme reductions also occur in the US wool yarns 
industries (–74%) and wool fabrics (–76%).  These results seem consistent with what has 
been observed in US wool processing from the year 2000 onwards.  Large changes are also 
observed for the carbonised wools industries in Germany (–41%), Italy (50%) and the UK 
(64%), and for the wool fabrics industries in Italy (43%), the UK (71%) and the ROW 
region (–40%).  The results also indicate a relocation of wool garments production away 
from France (–11%), Germany (–9%) and Italy (–12%), largely to China (5%) and the 
ROW (6%).     233
Table 6.9  Selected industry and commodity effects of changes in tariff barriers, 1997–
2005 (percentage change) 
 France  Germ  Italy  UK  USA  Japan  China  Aust  ROW 
  (a) Commodity pricea 
Sheep  meat  0.11 0.16 0.16 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.32 0.50 0.44 
Greasy  wools  -6.06 -3.31 -5.46  0.41  -32.74 -2.46 -5.39 -1.13 -5.21 
Scoured  wools  -2.34 -2.21 -2.29 -2.03  -24.17 -4.63 -4.30 -0.60 -4.92 
Carbon  wools  -8.93 -1.84 -1.38 -1.96  -21.87 -5.19 -4.58  0.94 -3.30 
Worsted  tops  -4.20 -4.84 -3.75 -5.05 -5.72 -1.96 -4.39 -3.91 -6.16 
Noils  24.69 27.41 25.33  3.32 20.89  2.58 14.34 24.78  7.19 
Wool  yarns  -0.22 2.44 3.21  -1.81 -9.33 -1.28 -1.35  0.09 -3.49 
Wool fabrics  -0.30  -0.45  0.98  -0.21 -3.23 -0.53 -5.51  0.08 -5.14 
Wool  garms  0.06 0.02 0.28 0.06  -3.28 -0.06 -3.55  0.06 -2.79 
Synth  textiles  0.05 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.04 
Other  goods  0.05 0.06 0.13 0.06  -0.01 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.04 
  (b) Industry output 
Sheep    0.50 0.41 0.16 0.29 0.07  0.22 -2.13 -2.59 -1.52 
Scoured  wools  -1.41 -12.46 -11.81  18.50 -51.83  -6.36 -16.82  5.59  -2.92 
Carbon wools  101.13  -41.46  50.48  64.16 -72.40  9.04 -19.70  28.06 -21.19 
Worsted tops  -7.74  -1.58  -12.87  -25.21 -29.88 -20.25 -23.32  0.13  10.75 
Wool yarns  10.93  7.68  21.89  34.75  -74.41  2.31 -28.69  -3.70 -30.74 
Wool  fabrics  13.37 27.74 43.49 70.83  -75.85 1.56 1.08  -4.32  -40.43 
Wool garms  -11.45  -9.26  -11.63  -2.51 1.58  -1.57 4.57  -3.61 5.99 
Other  indust  0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00  -0.02  0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
  (c) Domestic sales 
Sheep  meat  0.11 0.07 0.14 0.18 0.12 0.22 0.00  -0.10  -0.16 
Greasy  wools  -7.94 0 0  0.74  -42.28 0.00  -9.69 5.15  -11.14 
Scoured  wools  -3.10 -12.47 -11.82  26.39 -62.47  -6.36 -17.71  14.83 -12.16 
Carbon wools  44.03  -41.59  50.29  173.42  -72.61  9.04 -22.68 -15.39 -46.06 
Worsted  tops  -19.35 -0.11 -9.84  -24.00 -49.12 -18.79 -29.68  0 -36.62 
Noils -12.54  -3.73  -11.10  1.08  -78.01 -20.53 -43.15  0 -21.84 
Wool  yarns  2.72 57.60 26.21 71.73  -74.41  2.31 -58.01  -3.70 -77.71 
Wool  fabrics  -16.74 -24.21 -17.29  -8.70 -81.59  -2.53 -73.12  -4.32 -57.35 
Wool  garms  -9.70 -4.46 -3.05 -2.76 -0.90 -1.67 -6.84 -3.76 -1.03 
Synth  textiles  0.01 0.00 0.06  -0.01 -0.02  0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 
Other  goods  0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00  -0.03 0.00 0.00  -0.02  -0.01 
  (d) Imports 
Sheep  meat  -4.09 -3.05 -0.54 -3.81 -6.53 -1.55 -0.32  3.72  3.44 
Greasy wools   -1.43  -12.45  -11.81  25.91 -68.80  -6.29 -21.33  0  33.96 
Scoured wools  12.47  -2.24  50.37  36.69 -72.84  0.39 -70.63  0  35.77 
Carbon  wools  34.51 32.06 40.75  157.60  -76.30 -31.65 -72.46  53.54 549.19 
Worsted tops  8.95  5.69  11.09  -9.99 -25.82  -7.55 -29.61 -66.27 537.48 
Noils -3.20  -20.64  8.41  233.96  -71.70  3889.38 124.62 -10.21 143.94 
Wool  yarns  1.90 23.26 25.04 11.97  -63.81 -4.50 96.98  -22.48  0.07 
Wool fabrics  -11.41  -10.51  10.00  -4.53 572.60  0 122.99  0  97.58 
Wool garms  5.60  4.01  60.23  1.31  6.83 14.77 86.57 13.31  5.92 
Synth  textiles  0.04 0.05 0.51 0.06 -0.31 -0.07  0.23  0.02 -0.03 
Other  goods  -0.01 0.01 0.20 0.03  -0.14 -0.03  0.12 -0.02  0.00 
  (e) Exports 
Sheep  meat  3.07 4.35 4.02 4.23 5.39  1.60 -0.11 -0.38 -4.60 
Greasy  wools  0 -4.35 -7.50 -1.80  1273.31 -3.26  0.58  -14.65 -2.34 
Scoured  wools 83.67 -1.48 -7.00 -9.28  5314.12 -1.25 -6.39 -7.54 24.92 
Carbon wools  188.46  37.15  166.98  1.30  3128.93  -13.25 30.37 28.95 33.81 
Worsted tops  -5.29  68.21  -21.90  -24.60 7.76  -44.87  24.54 2.17  35.83 
Noils -7.32  46.79  -19.33  -46.18 -21.30  1948.67 173.93  -1.03  13.90 
Wool  yarns  13.27 2.97 4.65  33.28 0 0  37.22 0  94.42 
Wool  fabrics  33.86 43.75 72.34  88.04 164.77 150.38 416.84  0 397.72 
Wool  garms  -14.30 -22.33 -19.15 -0.75 73.67 11.11 22.02  4.76 20.39 
Synth  textiles  -0.01 -0.06 -0.48  -0.09 0.27 0.06  -0.29 0.00  -0.01 
Other  goods  0.00 -0.03 -0.13 -0.04  0.11  0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 
a This is the supply (or basic) price in each region.     234
  The changes in industry output do not show any consistent pattern of relocation of 
production of wool products from one set of regions to another.  This is to be expected as 
we are implementing observed changes in trade policy for wool products by many countries 
over the period 1997–2005.  The observed changes are a combination of unilateral tariff 
reductions and the implementation of multilateral and plurilateral trade agreements.  As 
such, the observed tariff reductions, and thus their effects, would not be expected to show 
any particular pattern of changes in output and trade across regions.  Nevertheless, we are 
able to identify the driving forces behind the largest and most interesting industry effects of 
the tariff reductions. 
  The single largest percentage change in industry output is that observed for the 
carbonising industries in France: these double in size (101%).  The doubling of output is 
partly due to a 44% increase in domestic sales to the domestic yarns industries, which 
consume around 60% of domestically-produced carbonised wools and whose output 
expands by 11%, but mainly due to a 188% increase in exports [panel (d), table 6.9].  Table 
6.8 [panel (b)] shows that the huge increase in exports is not due to lower tariff barriers on 
exports of carbonised wools from France.  Instead, it is driven by a large fall in the cost of 
producing carbonised wools in France (–9%; see panel (a), table 6.9)] relative to most other 
regions.  This is, in turn, is driven by a 10% fall in the price of imported scoured wools 
used by the carbonising industries; imported scoured wools comprises over 90% of total 
scoured wools inputs by the carbonising industries in France.5  These imports are sourced 
from the USA, Japan, China and the ROW, which experience the largest reductions in the 
price of scoured wools [panel (a)].  This example demonstrates that besides the three forces 
                                              
5 Carbonising industries only use the shortest scoured wools as inputs.  Thus, the 10% fall in the price of 
imported scoured wool referred to here is the price of the shortest imported scoured wool rather than the 
price of all imported scoured wool.  Scoured wools of medium and greater length are only used as inputs by 
the worsted top industries.   235
identified earlier as determining the response of a given industry’s output to the tariff 
changes, an industry may expand significantly simply due to cheaper imported wool inputs 
driven by tariff changes in other regions.   
  A large effect is also observed for the carbonising industries in the USA, which more 
than halve in size (–72%).  These industries are almost completely domestically oriented 
and the large reduction in output is driven exclusively by a 72% fall in domestic sales of 
carbonised wools.6  Although the import tariff on carbonised wools falls by 42% in the 
USA [panel (a), table 6.8], the domestic yarns industries, which are the users of carbonised 
wools, reduce demand for imported carbonised wools by more than for domestic 
carbonised wools, i.e., –76% versus –72%, indicating that the relative price of imported 
carbonised wools in the USA increase.  Thus, despite the significant reduction in the import 
tariff on carbonised wools, the price of domestic carbonised wools fall by 22% [panel (a), 
table 6.8] and the price of imported carbonised wools fall by only 6%.  The reason for this 
is the huge contraction observed in the domestic yarns industries in the USA (–74%) who 
are the only significant consumers of domestically-produced carbonised wools.   
  What causes the wool yarns industries in the USA to contract by 74%?  We note that 
there is a 26% fall in the tariff on imported wool yarns in the USA.  This causes 
substitution of cheaper imported wool yarns for domestic wool yarns.  Nevertheless, 
demand for both domestic and imported wool yarns falls by 74% and 64%.  The only 
consumers of wool yarns are the wool fabrics industries and these industries contract by 
76% in the USA; thus, demand for all wool yarns in the USA falls.  As the US wool yarns 
industries are completely domestically oriented, the huge contraction in the only purchaser 
                                              
6 Thus, the 3,129% rise in exports of carbonised wool from the USA [panel (d), table 6.9] are on an almost 
zero base and are therefore unimportant.     236
of their outputs (the US wool fabrics industries) drives a similarly huge contraction in their 
own output.   
  The largest single reduction in wool tariffs by the USA occurs for wool fabrics (–
63%).  Thus, imports of wool fabrics into the USA expand nearly five-fold (572%) [panel 
(d), table 6.9] and domestic sales contract by 82% [panel (c)].  At the same time there is a 
large reduction in the tariffs faced by exports of wool fabrics from the USA (–59%).  Thus, 
exports of wool fabrics from the USA expand by 165% [panel (e), table 6.9].  As around 
98% of the output of the US wool fabrics industries is sold to the domestic wool garments 
industries, the negative impact of the reduction in import tariffs on wool fabrics dominates 
the positive impact of the reduction in export barriers, so the output of the US wool fabrics 
industries contract by 76%.   
  Large changes are also observed for the carbonised wools industries in Germany (–
41%), Italy (50%) and the UK (64%).  For Germany, the contraction is driven by the 
indirect effect of changes in wool tariffs in other regions as tariffs on imports of carbonised 
wools into Germany do not change and neither do barriers on exports of carbonised wools 
from Germany.  Almost all of the output of the carbonised wools industries in Germany is 
sold to the domestic wool yarns industries.  Thus, the 42% contraction in domestic sales of 
carbonised wools determines that the output of the carbonised wools industries must also 
fall by a similar amount (–41%).7  This reflects substitution of cheaper imported carbonised 
wools for more expensive domestic carbonised wools; thus, imports of carbonised wools 
rise by 32%.   
  For Italy, the 50% expansion in the carbonised wools industries is driven purely by an 
equivalent 50% expansion in domestic sales to the wool yarns industries.  Even though 
                                              
7 The 37% rise in exports of carbonised wools from Germany has little effect on the output of these industries 
as exports comprise less than 1% of sales.     237
barriers on exports of carbonised wools from Italy fall by 34% and exports increase by 
167%, the industry is almost completely domestically oriented and so the strong rise in 
exports has little effect on output.  The strong rise in demand for domestic carbonised 
wools does not reflect strong substitution away from imports as they rise by 41%; it reflects 
a strong expansion effect due to a 22% increase in the size of the wool yarns industries.   
  In the UK the second largest industry expansion is that observed for carbonised 
wools: 64%.  The expansion is driven purely by the indirect effects of tariff changes 
elsewhere as there is no change in tariffs on imported carbonised wools or on barriers faced 
by exports of carbonised wools from the UK.  The UK carbonised wools industries are 
export oriented with around two-thirds of their output sold to foreign consumers.   
Nevertheless, exports only increase marginally (1%) and so make little contribution to the 
expansion in the output of these industries.  In contrast, domestic sales nearly triple (173%) 
and with around two-thirds of output sold domestically output increases by around 64% 
(=0.37x173%).  Imports of carbonised wools also expand strongly (158%) reflecting a 
small substitution effect and a strong expansion effect from the woollen yarn industries; the 
woollen yarn industries are the users of carbonised wools whereas worsted yarn industries 
are users of worsted tops; the blended and pure woollen yarn industries expand by 96% and 
198% (see rows 23 and 24, table A6.1 in the Appendix).  When aggregated across all yarn 
industries, total yarns output increases by only 35%.   
  The UK wool yarns industries are almost completely export oriented selling about 
96% of their output overseas, so although domestic sales increase by 72%, this has little 
effect on output.  In contrast, the 33% increase in exports almost completely drives the 35% 
expansion in output (0.96x33%=32%).  The large increase in exports of wool yarns from 
the UK is driven by a 67% fall in export barriers for wool yarns from the UK.     238
  Besides the carbonising and yarns industries, very large changes in output are also 
observed for wool fabrics industries in Italy (43%), the UK (71%) and the ROW region (–
40%).  Import tariffs on wool fabrics are reduced by 35% in Italy but export barriers on 
wool fabrics from Italy are reduced by 61%.  Lower import tariffs reduce domestic sales (–
17%) and encourage imports (10%).  Lower export tariff barriers encourage exports (72%).  
As the wool yarns industries sell about two-thirds of their output overseas (mainly to 
Germany and the ROW), the strong rise in exports dominates the fall in domestic sales and 
drives output upwards by 43%. 
  The largest single broad industry effect in the UK is that observed for the output of 
wool fabrics (71%).  Similar to Italy, the UK wool fabrics industries suffer from lower 
tariffs on imports (–35%) and benefit from lower tariffs on exports (–60%).  We observe 
substitution of imported for domestic wool fabrics; imports fall by 5% and domestic sales 
fall by 9%.  The contraction in the UK wool garments industries (–3%) reduces demand for 
both imported and domestic inputs.  At the same time, exports of wool fabrics from the UK 
expand by 88%.  With around four-fifths of UK wool fabrics exported, the strong rise in 
exports increases domestic output of wool fabrics by 71% (≈0.82x88%).   
  The final industry effect that is worth understanding in detail is the 40% contraction 
in ROW wool fabrics industries.  These industries experience similar changes in import 
tariffs and export barriers: –58% and –61%.  Imports are substituted for domestic wool 
fabrics; imports rise by 6% whereas domestic sales fall by 57%.  At the same time, exports 
increase nearly five-fold (398%).  The ROW wool fabrics industries are domestically 
oriented; they sell about two-thirds of their output to the domestic wool garments 
industries.  Thus, although exports rise strongly the fall in domestic sales dominates and 
output contracts by 40%.   
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6.3.2.1  Why does allocative efficiency fall in Australia 
  The reduction in tariff barriers over 1997–2005 would be expected to improve the 
efficiency with which resources are used in the economy.  Earlier we defined allocative 
efficiency using the variable qnit, and we observed that qnit rose in all regions except 
Australia (see row 6, table 6.4).  This is a counter-intuitive result that we now explain.    
 We  redefine  qnit into net (of subsidies) indirect taxes levied on industries, 
IND
j qnit , 
and net indirect taxes on commodities, 
COM





jj j i j i j i qnit SNITF qf SNITF qf
= =+ ∑ ; (6.3) 
  { }
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== = =+ + + + ∑∑ ∑  
  ii i i SNITX qx SNITM qm + . (6.4) 
As before, the SNs represent shares and the qs represent percentage-change quantity 
variables.  That is, 
IND
j qnit  is defined in terms of the changes in the quantity bases of taxes 
on industries, i.e., taxes on output and primary factor usage; 
COM
i qnit  is defined in terms of 
the changes in the quantity bases of taxes on commodities, i.e., taxes on intermediate input 
usage, inputs to investment, household consumption, government consumption, and exports 
and imports.  We also define concomitant Divisia indices for 
IND
j qnit  and 
COM
i qnit ; 
 
1
J IND IND IND
jj j qnit SNIT qnit
= =∑ ,   (6.5) 
 
1
K COM COM COM
ii i qnit SNIT qnit
= =∑ . (6.6) 
Table 6.10 presents the values of 
IND
j qnit , 
COM
i qnit , 
IND qnit  and 
COM qnit  for Australia from 
the simulations.   
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Table 6.10  Industry and commodity allocative efficiency effects in Australia due to 
changes in tariff barriers, 1997–2005 (percentage change) 
(a) Commodity tax base: 
COM
i qnit   (b) Industry tax base: 
IND
j qnit  
Sheep meat     -0.34  Sheep      1.79 
Greasy wools      4.27  Scoured wools    -5.20 
Scoured wools    28.12  Carbon wools  -21.98 
Carbon wools    28.95  Worsted tops    -7.00 
Worsted tops     2.17  Wool yarns    -3.41 
Noils    -1.03  Wool fabrics    -4.36 
Wool yarns  -22.48  Wool garments    -3.62 
Wool fabrics         0  Other industries    -0.02 
Wool garms  13.15     
Synth textiles    0.00     
Other goods    0.00     
Total: 
COM qnit     0.14  Total: 
IND qnit     -0.04 
 
  We see from panel (a), table 6.10 that overall allocative efficiency from commodity 
sales in Australia improves by 0.14%.  In contrast, panel (b) indicates that allocative 
efficiency from industry output falls by 0.04%; this is driven by a fall in allocative 
efficiency from all industries except the sheep industry.  The sheep industry is subsidised in 
net terms.  Thus, when it contracts [see panel (b), table 6.9] it makes a positive contribution 
to allocative efficiency (1.79%).  The early-stage processing industries (i.e., scoured wools, 
carbonised wools, and worsted tops) all expand from the tariff changes, but these industries 
are already larger than optimum as they are also subsidised in net terms.  Thus, they make a 
negative contribution to allocative efficiency: –5%, –22% and –7%.  All other industries 
are taxed in net terms (i.e., wool yarns and fabrics, and the other industries composite).  
Thus, they are smaller than optimum.  So when they contract from the tariff changes they 
make a negative contribution to allocative efficiency: –3%, –4%, –4% and –0.02%.  In 
sum, allocative efficiency falls in Australia because most of the industries that contract are 
already smaller than optimum and all the industries that expand are already larger than 
optimum.   
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6.4  The costs of 2005 wool tariff barriers 
  Having imposed the changes in wool tariff barriers between 1997 and 2005, we now 
completely remove 2005 wool tariffs and examine the micro and macroeconomic effects. 
 
6.4.1  Macroeconomic effects 
  We noted earlier that there are two potential initial effects of tariff reductions.  First, 
wool tariff reductions reduce the price of imported wool products; wool industries will 
substitute imported wool products for domestic wool products and, ceteris paribus, 
domestic wool industries will contract.  The size of this initial effect is indicated by the 
percentage change in the average indirect tax rate due to the tariff reductions weighted by 
the share of the indirect taxes in GDP (table 6.11, row 1).  For all regions except China, this 
effect is larger (sometimes up to 10 times larger) here than for the changes in recent (1997–
2005) wool tariffs.  For China, this effect is slightly smaller here than for recent wool 
tariffs.  This suggests that all regions except China will experience a much larger initial 
contractionary effect from current (2005) wool tariffs compared to recent wool tariffs.   
 
Table 6.11  Macroeconomic effects of the complete removal of 2005 wool tariff 
barriers (percentage change)  
 France  Germ  Italy  UK  USA  Japan  China  Aust  ROW  World 
1. Ind tax ratea  -0.013 -0.019 -0.011 -0.016 -0.037 -0.009 -0.043 -0.017 -0.040   
2. Exprt tariffb   -0.318 -0.748 -4.311 -0.197 -0.071 -0.032 -1.725 -0.193 -0.849   
3. Real GDP  -0.046 -0.064 -0.076 -0.012 -0.040 -0.020  0.048 -0.035 -0.026 -0.032 
4. Value added  -0.048  -0.068  -0.080  -0.016 -0.046 -0.020  0.014 -0.036 -0.034 -0.038 
5. Capital stock  -0.095  -0.154  -0.148  -0.044 -0.123 -0.051  0.038 -0.080 -0.075 -0.091 
6. Ind tax basec -0.034 -0.027  -0.036 0.029 0.133 -0.022  0.203 -0.029  0.042  0.031 
a Indirect tax rate weighted by share of indirect taxes in GDP.  b Tariff rate faced by exports weighted by share of exports 
in GDP.  c This is qnit in equation (6.1); see text for explanation.   
 
  The second initial effect of wool tariff reductions is increased demand for exports of 
wool products, which will cause domestic wool industries (in the exporting regions) to 
expand.  A measure of the size of this effect is the percentage change in the average tariff   242
barrier faced by exports weighted by the share of exports in GDP (table 6.11, row 2).  
Export barriers fall by more for current wool tariffs than for recent wool tariffs; this is as 
expected given that we are simulating the complete removal of all remaining wool tariff 
barriers.  Nevertheless, for most regions the fall in export barriers for current wool tariffs is 
only one to two orders of magnitude larger than for recent wool tariffs.  Similar to the 
effects of recent wool tariffs, this measure indicates that Italy and China are expected to 
experience far and away the strongest increases in export demand, and the USA the 
smallest.   
  Globally, the largest tariff barriers in place in 2005 are on wool fabrics (10%) and 
garments (18%), see table 6.3.  For Italy and China, the average import tariff faced by 
exports of wool fabrics and garments is 15% and 17%.  Combined with the large share that 
wool fabrics and garments comprise in total exports for these two regions, i.e., about 5% 
and 3%, gives Italy and China the strongest increase in export demand from the removal of 
current wool tariffs.  Only Australia has an export pattern that favours wool products to 
such an extent but this is for raw wool, which comprises about 4% of total exports, and 
faces an average tariff barrier of only about 2%.  Thus Australia is expected to experience 
one of the smallest increases in exports from the removal of current wool tariffs.   
  The relative sizes of the two initial effects will largely determine the size of the 
effects on real GDP effects (table 6.11, row 3).  Given that all regions except China 
experience much larger contractionary effects from cheaper imports, compared to recent 
wool tariffs, and only slightly larger expansionary effects from lower export barriers, 
compared to recent wool tariffs, we should expect that most regions should experience less 
favourable real GDP effects from current wool tariffs than from recent wool tariffs.  This is 
exactly what is observed.     243
  Earlier we defined the percentage change in real GDP (qgdp) from the income side as 
a function of the change in the use of resources in the economy (qva) and the change in the 
efficiency with which resources are used in the economy (qnit), i.e.,  
  qgdp SVAqva SNITqnit = + ; (6.7) 
where qva and qnit are the percentage changes in real value added and the quantity base 
upon which net (of subsidies) indirect taxes are levied, and SVA and SNIT are the shares of 
value added and net indirect taxes in GDP.   
  As only capital is variable in the long run, any change in qva will be due to a change 
in capital.  The tariff changes cause qva to fall in all regions except China (table 6.11, row 
4) and this is due to a fall in the use of capital (row 5).  The changes in qva move in the 
same way as qgdp and by a similar amount in all regions except China; this explains why 
qgdp expands in China and falls in all other regions.   
  We noted earlier that where the composition of sectoral outputs and sales do not 
change, qnit and qva will also move together, as qnit is the weighted sum of sales and qva 
is the weighted sum of (net) industry outputs.  But the tariff changes induce a change in 
each economy’s production and sales structure.  The compositional changes cause qva and 
qnit to diverge in all regions (cf. rows 4 and 6), but the differences are small for Japan and 
Australia indicating small changes in the composition of sectoral outputs and sales.  China 
is the only region where qgdp (0.048%) exceeds qva (0.014%) and the excess represents a 
significant allocative efficiency gain (0.203%) from changing the composition of the 
economy in favour of activities that were discouraged (relative to optimum) in the pre-
shock tax regime.  A similar compositional change occurs in the UK, USA and ROW 
where  qnit  also  rises.  For France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Australia, allocative 
efficiency falls; so in these regions the tariff changes lead to compositional changes that   244
favour activities that were encouraged (relative to optimum) in the pre-shock tax regime.  
This is analysed in more detail in section 6.4.2. 
 
6.4.1.1  The capital stock response  
  Unlike the effects of recent wool tariffs, current wool tariffs cause a consistent pattern 
of effects upon regional capital stocks (table 6.12, row 1); capital stocks fall everywhere 
except China.  This reflects a rise in the relative price of capital everywhere except China 
as a response to the tariff reductions (row 2c).  A rise in the relative price of capital reflects 
the contractionary initial effect of the tariff changes, i.e., a contraction in domestic 
industries (due to substitution of imported wool products for domestic wool products) that, 
in turn, reduces the demand for primary factors in the economy.  This favours the fixed 
factors (land and labour) and discriminates against the variable factor (capital); the relative 
price of capital will rise and industries will substitute land and labour for capital.  This is 
what happens in most regions. 
 
Table 6.12  Effects on regional capital stocks and relative primary factor prices of the 
complete removal of 2005 wool tariff barriers (percentage change) 
 France  Germ  Italy  UK  USA  Japan  China  Aust  ROW  World 
1. Capital stock  -0.095  -0.154  -0.148  -0.044 -0.123 -0.051  0.038 -0.080 -0.075 -0.091 
2. Relative prices            
2a. Landa  -0.038 -0.050 -0.026 -0.022 -0.030 -0.002 -0.134  0.089 -0.036 -0.002 
2b. Laboura  -0.035 -0.047 -0.057 -0.009 -0.031 -0.015  0.035 -0.028 -0.034 -0.030 
2c. Capitala  0.035 0.060 0.048 0.016 0.051 0.024  -0.025 0.028 0.042 0.040 
a These are relative prices, i.e., the price of the primary factor deflated by the average price of all primary factors.  Here 
all prices are purchaser’s prices.   
 
  For China, the contractionary effect of the tariff changes is outweighed by the 
expansionary effect, i.e., the increase in demand for a region’s exports where tariff barriers 
faced by those exports are lowered.  Domestic industries (in the exporting region) will 
expand in response to increased export demand.  In general, expanding domestic industries   245
will increase the demand for primary factors in the economy.  Ceteris paribus, this will 
favour the variable factor (capital) and discriminate against the fixed factors (land and 
capital); the relative price of capital will fall and industries will substitute capital for land 
and labour.  This is what occurs in China.   
  Thus for most regions the contractionary effect from cheaper imports is greater than 
the expansionary effect from increased export demand.  For China, the contractionary effect 
is more than offset by the expansionary effect, the relative price of capital falls and the 
capital stock expands.   
 
6.4.1.2  The trade response  
  Similar to the effects of recent wool tariffs, the complete removal of current wool 
tariffs leads to increased imports in all regions (table 6.13, row 2).  A rise in imports must 
be offset by a rise in exports (row 1) as the trade balance to GDP ratio is assumed fixed in 
all regions.  The more that the terms of trade improve (row 3), the less that exports must 
rise to maintain the trade balance to GDP ratio.  The terms of trade improve for France 
(0.007%), Germany (0.028%), the UK (0.046%), China (0.128%) and Australia (0.083%).  
For France, the UK and China, exports rise by less than imports due to the terms of trade 
improvement; for Germany and Australia, the terms of trade of trade improvement is so 
strong and the increase in imports (0.004% and 0.064%) so small that exports (–0.027% 
and –0.006%) are able to fall and the initial trade balance to GDP ratio is maintained.  The 
terms of trade deteriorate for Italy (–0.086%), the USA (–0.011%), Japan (–0.073%) and 
the ROW (–0.001%); thus exports rise by more than imports in all these regions.   
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Table 6.13  Regional trade effects of the complete removal of 2005 wool tariffs 
(percentage change) 
 France  Germ  Italy  UK  USA  Japan  China  Aust  ROW 
1. Exports  0.013  -0.027  0.338  0.034 0.244 0.162 0.756  -0.006 0.153 
2.  Imports  0.027 0.004 0.302 0.076 0.188 0.130 0.960 0.064 0.151 
3. Terms of trade  0.007  0.028  -0.086 0.046  -0.011  -0.073 0.128 0.083  -0.001 
3a. Export price  0.043  0.059  -0.032 0.087 0.029  -0.017 0.158 0.131 0.047 
3b. Import price   0.036  0.031  0.054 0.041 0.040 0.056 0.029 0.048 0.048 
4. Export tariffa  -0.318 -0.748 -4.311 -0.197 -0.071 -0.032 -1.725 -0.193 -0.849 
5.  GNE  -0.042 -0.055 -0.095  0.001 -0.038 -0.026  0.085 -0.019 -0.024 
6. GNE in export 
destinationsb  -0.031 -0.028 -0.027 -0.033 -0.023 -0.018 -0.031 -0.022 -0.028 
7. Price of value 
added   0.046  0.067  -0.034  0.092 0.048  -0.025 0.299 0.072 0.081 
a Tariff rate faced by exports weighted by share of exports in GDP.  b For a given region, this is GNE in destination 
regions weighted by export shares.  
 
  Similar to the effects of recent wool tariffs, import prices rise in all regions (row 3b, 
table 6.13) due to substitution of cheaper imported goods for domestic goods.  But just like 
the effects of recent wool tariffs, the variation in import prices across regions is small; from 
0.029% (China) to 0.056% (Japan).  Export prices also rise in all regions (row 3a) except 
Italy (–0.032%) and Japan (–0.017%).  For all other regions the variation in export prices is 
larger than that observed for import prices; that is, from 0.029% (USA) to 0.158% (China).  
This was also observed with recent wool tariffs; so, as before, the differences in terms of 
trade changes across regions are largely due to the differences in the prices of exports.   
  The differences in export prices partly reflect the degree to which demand expands 
for the exports of each region.  This is largely a function of the degree to which tariff 
barriers faced by each region fall (row 4, table 6.13); Germany, Italy, China and the ROW 
experience the largest such reductions.  The differences in export prices also partly reflect 
the degree to which demand conditions (GNE; row 5) in a region’s export destinations (row 
6) interact with lower domestic costs (row 7) in the exporting region.  So, export prices for 
Italy and Japan fall due to a combination of reduced GNE in export destinations and lower 
domestic costs, despite the reductions in tariff barriers faced by their exports; all other 
regions experience higher domestic costs.  The fall in Italy’s export prices (–0.032%) is   247
twice that of Japan’s (–0.017%) as GNE in export destinations and domestic costs fall by 
more in Italy that in Japan.   
  For China, the strong export price rise (0.158%) reflects a strong rise in domestic 
costs (0.299%), more than three times that of any other region.  Similar to recent wool 
tariffs, Australia experiences the second largest export price rise (0.131%).  Australia 
experiences a small fall in export barriers (–0.193%) relative to other regions, a noticeable 
rise in domestic costs (0.072%), and a relatively weak fall in GNE in export destinations 
(0.022%) due to a strong trade orientation China, which experiences the only noticeable 
rise in GNE (0.085%). 
 
6.4.1.3  Welfare effects 
  The welfare effects of recent tariff changes generally diverged from the real GDP 
effects.  For current wool tariffs, this pattern is reversed; real household income (row 5, 
table 6.14) moves in the same direction as real GDP effect (row 6) in all regions except the 
UK.  Nevertheless, the real income gain in the UK (0.002%) is only slightly positive 
compared with the 0.012% fall in real GDP.  Not only do the signs of the welfare effects 
reflect the real GDP effects for most regions, but the sizes of the changes are also similar 
for all regions except Italy, China and ROW.  For Italy and China, the absolute size of the 
welfare effect is larger (–0.109% and 0.099%) than the absolute size of the real GDP effect 
(–0.076% and 0.048%).  For the ROW, the welfare effect (–0.013%) is half that of the real 
GDP effect (–0.026%).   
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Table 6.14  Regional welfare effects of the complete removal of 2005 wool tariffs 
(percentage change) 
 France  Germ  Italy  UK  USA  Japan  China  Aust  ROW 
1. Factor incomea -0.001 -0.001 -0.114  0.077  0.002  -0.045 0.313 0.036 0.047 
1a. Land inca   0.016  0.022  -0.060  0.072  0.011  -0.026 0.164 0.173 0.044 
1b. Labour inca  0.011 0.020  -0.091 0.084 0.017  -0.040 0.334 0.044 0.047 
1c. Capital inca  -0.014 -0.027 -0.134  0.065 -0.023  -0.052 0.311 0.020 0.048 
2. Income tax rate  0.086  0.078  0.079 0.113 0.207 0.123 2.790 0.175 0.354 
3. Disp incomeb  -0.037 -0.058 -0.146  0.049 -0.051  -0.057 0.263 0.002  -0.009 
4. CPI  0.014  0.017  -0.037  0.047  -0.011  -0.033 0.163 0.035 0.004 
5. Real incomec  -0.051 -0.075 -0.109  0.002 -0.040 -0.024  0.099 -0.033 -0.013 
5a.  US$  million  -431 -800 -778  15  -2549 -796  746 -102 -937 
6. Real GDP  -0.046  -0.064  -0.076  -0.012 -0.040 -0.020  0.048 -0.035 -0.026 
a These are pre-tax nominal variables.  b This is post-tax nominal household factor income.  c This is post-tax nominal 
household factor income (row 3) minus the consumer price index (row 4). 
 
  The income tax rate (row 2, table 6.14) rises in all regions in response to the complete 
removal of 2005 wool tariffs.  The largest rises are in regions where there is a large fall in 
the indirect tax rate (weighted by the share of indirect taxes in GDP) (row 1, table 6.11) and 
the direct tax base is relatively small.8  For instance, the USA, China and ROW all 
experience similar reductions in the (weighted) indirect tax rate (–0.037%, –0.043% and –
0.04%), but the income tax rate rises least in the USA (0.207%) and most in China and 
ROW (2.79% and 0.354%).  And this is in spite of the fact that the economy (real GDP) 
shrinks by more in the US (–0.4%) than in ROW (–0.026%) and grows in China (0.048%).  
China and ROW, like most developing regions, have a smaller direct tax base upon which 
to replace the indirect revenue lost due to the tariff reductions, e.g., the share of direct taxes 
in GDP is 2% for China and 12% for ROW.  In contrast, the same share is 20% for the 
USA.   
                                              
8 Note that the government budget position is fixed and the income tax rate is variable in the long run; 
therefore any pressure on government revenue from lower import taxes is accommodated by the income tax 
rate adjusting upwards.     249
  The rise in income tax rates is large enough to reduce nominal household disposable 
income (row 3) in all but three regions: the UK (0.049%), China (0.263%) and Australia 
(0.002%).  The consumer price index (row 4) rises in all these regions but by less than 
disposable income in the UK and China so that real household income rises by 0.002% and 
0.099%, whereas in Australia the consumer price index rises significantly (0.035%) thus 
reducing real income by 0.033%.  Consequently, the UK and China are the only gainers 
from the complete removal of 2005 wool tariffs; the gains are worth $15 and $746 million 
annually in 1997 US dollars.  Both of these regions also gain from changes in recent wool 
tariffs.  The single biggest loser from the removal of current wool tariffs is Italy, which 
suffers a real income decline of 0.109% or $US 778 million annually.  This contrasts 
strongly with a gain of 0.094% or $US 672 million from changes in recent wool tariffs.   
 
6.4.2  Microeconomic effects  
  The complete removal of 2005 wool tariffs provides two countervailing forces on a 
given industry’s output.  One, the contractionary effect from the degree to which the price 
of competing imports falls due to lower tariffs; this depends on the size of the initial import 
tariff [panel (a), table 6.15].9  Two, the expansionary effect from the degree to which the 
tariff barriers it faces in export markets fall [panel (b)].10   
                                              
9 These are the actual rates from the model database after the changes in wool tariffs between 1997 and 2005 
have been imposed.  At the level of aggregation presented in table 6.15, these rates differ from the 2005 
rates presented in table 6.3 in two ways.  First, the regional import shares used to calculate the averages in 
table 6.15 are based on the 2005 (post-shock) model database, whereas those in table 6.3 are based on the 
1997 (pre-shock) model database.  The two sets of shares differ due to the effects of the changes in wool 
tariffs between 1997 and 2005.  Regardless, at the 56 commodity level the rates in table 6.15 correspond 
exactly with those in table 6.3.  Second, the rates for raw wool (i.e., greasy wool, scoured wool, carbonised 
wool, worsted tops, and noils) by China in table 6.15 are the same as the 1997 rates presented in table 6.3, 
as the increases calculated between 1997 and 2005 have not been imposed, see p. 215.   
10 In Section 6.3.2 we also mentioned that changes in the relative price of the primary factor used most 
intensively as influencing changes in industry output.  As was observed for changes in wool tariffs between 
1997 and 2005, the changes in relative prices from 2005 wool tariffs do not cause large changes in relative 
primary factor prices.  Thus, we do not discuss these changes here.     250
Table 6.15  2005 wool import and export tariff barriers (per cent)  
 France  Germ  Italy  UK  USA  Japan  China  Aust  ROW 
  (a) Import tariff barriers 
Greasy  wools   0 0 0 0  18.7 0  9.0 0  1.2 
Scourd  wools  0 0 0 0  18.7 0  9.0 0  1.2 
Carbon  wools 1.9 1.6 2.0 1.1 6.9  0  10.0  0 3.7 
Worsted  tops  1.9 1.7 1.5 1.1 6.9  0  10.0  0 3.7 
Noils  1.8 1.2 1.8 1.9 6.9  0  10.0  0 3.7 
Wool  yarns  0.6 1.0 0.7 0.6 6.0 2.7 5.0 5.0  10.1 
Wool  fabrics  0.6 0.9 2.8  1.7 25.0  0 10.0  0 14.7 
Wool garms  7.9  8.6  10.7  8.3 25.1 10.6 15.6 17.5 24.2 
  (b) Export tariff barriers 
Greasy  wools    0 9.0  11.6 7.5  0  0 0.7 2.7 3.8 
Scourd  wools  0.3 0.0 0.0  0.2 0 0  0.9  1.5  0.4 
Carbon  wools 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 
Worsted  tops  0.2 0.5 0.3 0.7 2.0 3.1 2.6 2.4 2.1 
Noils  0.0 0.0  0 4.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 
Wool  yarns  2.5 5.6 4.8 4.2  0  0 6.9  0 5.0 
Wool  fabrics  10.6 11.8 14.5 14.2 13.4 12.1 16.7  0 14.5 
Wool  garms  17.2 19.3 14.7 19.6 21.9 17.1 16.9 19.8 20.4 
 
  The changes in industry output [panel (b), table 6.16] show a general pattern; wool 
industries in China either expand or are largely unaffected whereas wool industries 
everywhere else generally contract.  This contrasts with the effects of changes in wool 
tariffs between 1997 and 2005 that showed extreme and divergent changes in industry 
output across regions.  Except for the sheep and wool garments industries, all wool 
industries in China expand by between 35% and 62%.  The sheep industry contracts 
slightly by –0.5% and the wool garments industries expand by 9%.  Wool industries 
generally contract in other regions but there are exceptions; significant exceptions are the 
carbonising industries in France (19%), the UK wool garments industries (24%), and the 
scoured wools (64%) and worsted tops (343%) industries in the US.   
  The general expansion in wool industries in China represents a unique interaction 
between the effects of cheaper imported wool inputs due to the removal of tariffs and 
increased export sales due to lower export barriers.  This is reflected in the fact that 
domestic sales, imports and exports expand for most of the wool industries in China; thus, 
scale effects drive the expansions in these industries.  Tariffs on raw wool in China are   251
reduced from an initial rate of around 10%;11 thus imports of all types of raw wool except 
noils expand strongly by between 117% and 202%.  At the same time, domestic sales of all 
types of raw wool except greasy wools also increase by between 25% and 50%.  Thus, 
imports improve their market shares as substitution of imported for domestic raw wool 
occurs.  At the same time, exports of all forms of raw wool also expand strongly by 
between 42% and 223%; but this is not a reflection of the removal of significant exports 
barriers as they only range between 0.7% and 2.6%.   
  Increased raw wool exports from China reflects lower domestic prices due to cheaper 
imported wool inputs.  Thus, the prices of all raw wool products in China fall relative to 
most other regions [panel (a), table 6.16].  Although increased exports helps drive the 
expansion in output by the raw wool industries in China, it is not the dominant effect as 
these industries are not, in general, export oriented.  The main contributor to increased 
output is higher domestic sales to upstream industries, that is, wool yarns, fabrics and 
garments, which expand by 36%, 47% and 9%.  The expansion in these industries is purely 
due to increased exports of 66%, 78% and 22%, reflecting lower domestic prices relative to 
most other regions.  The wool yarns, fabrics and garments industries in China are heavily 
export oriented, exporting 59%, 77% and 46% of their output.  These industries benefit 
from cheaper domestic and imported wool inputs due to the removal of import tariffs.  They 
also benefit from the removal of significant export barriers, e.g., 7% for wool yarns and 
17% for wool fabrics and garments.   
                                              
11 That is, greasy, scoured and carbonised wool, worsted tops, and noils.     252
Table 6.16  Selected industry and commodity effects due to the complete removal of 
2005 wool tariff barriers (percentage change) 
 France  Germ  Italy  UK  USA  Japan  China  Aust  ROW 
  (a) Commodity pricea 
Sheep meat  0.02  0.01  -0.03  0.06 0.05 0.01 0.30  -0.06  -0.08 
Greasy  wools  -1.42 5.31 5.71 2.70 -7.62 -1.73 -1.09  0.73  2.45 
Scoured  wools  0.29 0.74 0.53 1.22  -10.96 0.42  -4.74 0.48 2.04 
Carbon  wools  -3.05 0.73 3.10 1.81  -4.84 0.10  -3.83 1.36 2.21 
Worsted  tops  -0.96 0.97 0.41  -5.26  -12.54 -1.09 -5.18 -1.47 -0.89 
Noils  -0.20 9.73 1.94  10.23  -10.61  18.49  -1.45 7.92 1.95 
Wool yarns  -1.60  -0.51  0.16  -0.40 -2.50  2.58 -2.29  0.94 -0.80 
Wool  fabrics  -0.68 -0.98 -0.23 -0.12 -0.97  0.43 -2.66  0.01 -3.25 
Wool  garms  -0.38 -0.54 -0.48 -0.28 -3.98  0.06 -2.01  0.06 -2.84 
Synth  textiles  0.07 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.17 0.08 0.08 
Other goods  0.05  0.06  -0.02  0.09 0.05  -0.02 0.24 0.07 0.07 
  (b) Industry output 
Sheep   -0.23  -0.20  0.02  -0.14  -0.12 0.04  -0.51 0.69 0.50 
Scoured  wools  -33.86 -43.01 -39.37 -13.19 63.60  -33.14 62.65 -3.91 -7.51 
Carbon  wools  19.25 -49.06 -11.50  -4.57 -71.62 -11.68  54.54  0.46  -2.56 
Worsted  tops  -34.65 -38.40 -40.03 -29.88 343.38 -46.50  48.36  -8.39  7.21 
Wool yarns  6.45  5.16  -1.21  0.62 -58.93 -18.75  35.95 -15.71  6.26 
Wool  fabrics  -5.77 5.80 5.02 6.97  -57.71 -5.54 47.43 -3.16  -19.82 
Wool  garms  -16.13 -11.98 -10.21  24.38 0.72  -4.65 9.33  -2.90 7.27 
Other  indust  -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04  0.00 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 
  (c) Domestic sales 
Sheep meat  -0.06  -0.08  0.02  -0.11 -0.09  0.04 -0.02 -0.01  0.02 
Greasy  wools    -2.21 0 0  2.84  -11.26 0  -6.93  -3.58  -8.42 
Scoured  wools  -38.95 -43.01 -39.36  -7.48 39.41  -33.14 50.44 -3.16 -2.25 
Carbon  wools  12.49 -49.27 -11.48  3.85 -73.18 -11.68  37.23 -28.44 -16.82 
Worsted  tops  -41.13 -39.00 -39.37  -35.64 99.02  -47.36 25.78  0 -5.18 
Noils  -27.79 -36.93 -42.12 -34.26 -61.06 -47.62  37.20  0  -4.34 
Wool  yarns  -13.33 -0.29 -3.11 -7.55 -58.93 -18.75  -6.61 -15.71 -75.33 
Wool  fabrics  -36.54 -45.70 -24.43 -15.40 -95.64  -7.16 -56.08  -3.16 -74.48 
Wool garms  -35.21  -8.52  -14.24  -7.72 -7.01 -4.62 -1.91 -6.17 -5.82 
Synth  textiles  0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02  0.07 -0.11 -0.03 -0.03 
Other  goods  -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 
  (d) Imports 
Sheep meat  1.11  0.82  -0.48  1.75  2.16 -0.29  6.99 -0.67 -1.29 
Greasy  wools  -33.91 -43.00 -39.37 -18.91 256.98 -33.07 116.68  0  -4.64 
Scoured  wools  -16.82 -33.41 -11.45 -15.72 277.93  15.50 141.48  0  21.36 
Carbon wools  30.50  11.28  6.67  19.38  -82.04 11.35  202.44 15.41 97.36 
Worsted tops  7.73  13.36  0.44  9.34  22.10 -48.98 135.88 -72.30  69.58 
Noils 24.77  109.23  3.06  2.24  -74.55  80.01 -22.84 -16.56  19.39 
Wool  yarns  -16.28 9.65 9.65  -0.20 76.85 55.04 42.15  107.23  8.66 
Wool fabrics  -11.43  -11.21  34.83 32.21 25.09  0 24.08  0 36.67 
Wool garms  21.52  10.69  187.49  6.89 21.32 38.57 22.24 19.22 22.23 
Synth textiles  -0.06  0.01  -0.46  0.00 -0.19 -0.38  0.65 -0.07 -0.07 
Other  goods  -0.09 -0.09 -0.25  0.02 -0.09 -0.21  0.33 -0.04 -0.01 
  (e) Exports 
Sheep  meat  -1.27 -1.46 -0.49 -1.97 -1.76  0.49 -6.58 -0.49  1.46 
Greasy  wools  0 7.18 8.02  196.53  250.89 -2.36 42.48  9.23 30.69 
Scoured  wools 107.40 -44.40 -44.82 -41.70 151.00 -44.40 189.11  -5.24 -18.70 
Carbon wools  24.44  5.12  -16.76  -17.41 131.76  15.22 223.32  0.85  9.92 
Worsted  tops  -33.47 -24.39 -41.85 -18.89 555.58  -2.32 157.69  -9.02  11.71 
Noils  -34.57 -12.99 -26.76 -37.04 354.80 -89.50  61.96  -7.72  4.54 
Wool  yarns  11.61 5.91 8.12  1.05 0 0  65.71 0  31.55 
Wool  fabrics  7.24 14.14 11.63  9.32 53.03 17.52 77.69  0  101.81 
Wool garms  16.76  -23.64  -5.99  247.14 133.51  -7.48  22.36 169.99  29.74 
Synth textiles  0.01  -0.04  0.42  -0.06 0.10 0.37  -0.79 0.01  -0.03 
Other goods  -0.01  -0.04  0.16  -0.10  0.01  0.15 -0.30 -0.05 -0.05 
a This is the supply (or basic) price in each region.     253
  In percentage-change terms, the largest changes in wool industry output are observed 
in the USA; this is similar to what is observed for the changes in wool tariffs over 1997–
2005.  Most US wool industries contract significantly from the complete removal of 2005 
wool tariffs as the initial tariffs are significant for all wool industries: 19% for greasy and 
scoured wools; 7% for carbonised wools, worsted tops and noils; 6% for yarns; 25% for 
wool fabrics and garments.  Thus, large increases in imports and large decreases in 
domestic sales are observed for most wool products.  On the export side, the only 
significant barriers are those on wool fabrics (13%) and wool garments (22%) and the 
removal of these increases exports by 53% and 134%.  Nevertheless, the wool fabrics and 
garments industries are not export oriented and hence the large increases in exports do not 
offset the fall in domestic sales: –96% for wool fabrics and –7% for wool garments.  The 
result is a 58% contraction in the output of the wool fabrics industries and a 0.7% 
expansion in the output of the wool garments industries.   
  For the four European regions, the complete removal of current wool tariffs generally 
leads to contractions in wool industries.  Comparing 2005 import tariffs with export barriers 
(table 6.15) we see that import tariffs are larger than export barriers from most types of raw 
wool.  Thus, the industries producing these products (sheep, scouring, carbonising and 
worsted tops) tend to contract [table 6.16, panel (b)].  For industries in this set that are 
domestically oriented (e.g., sheep and scoured wools in France, all raw wool producing 
industries in Germany, Italy and the UK), lower output is driven mainly by lower domestic 
sales [panel (c)] that tend to be replaced by increased imports [panel (d)].  For industries in 
this set that are export oriented, the export response dominates the output response: 
carbonised wools industries in France export 24% more and output increases by 19%, 
worsted tops industries in France export around 34% less and output falls by 34%.     254
  Most European wool fabrics and yarns industries experience small output expansions.  
They benefit from increased exports but lose from lower domestic sales that are replaced by 
imports.  Almost all industries in this set are export oriented and the removal of significant 
export barriers benefits them more than the removal of less significant import tariffs.  The 
relative significance of import and export barriers for the wool garments industries in 
Europe is similar to that for wool fabrics; export barriers are much more significant than 
import barriers.  But, surprisingly, all of these industries experience significant contractions 
except in the UK.  The removal of import tariffs decreases domestic sales and increases 
imports.  All of these industries are domestically oriented and reduced domestic sales drives 
output lower for all of them except in the UK.  Exports of wool garments from the UK rise 
by 247% and this huge increase leads to an output expansion of 24%.  Exports of wool 
garments from Germany and Italy fall (24% and 6%) and rise from France (17%).   
  The divergent response of exports of wool garments across the European regions 
reflects divergent export responses across the 12 individual garment types (table 6.17).  The 
export response of wool garments by these regions is dominated by men’s woollen woven 
garments (rows 7 and 9).  Regardless of the enormous increase in exports of these two 
garment types from all four European regions, the overall effect on total wool garments 
exports is negative for Germany and Italy and positive for France and the UK.  For France 
and the UK, these two garment types represent 27% and 22% of total wool garments 
exports; for Germany and Italy, these two garment types represent less than 1% of total 
wool garments exports.   
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Table 6.17  Export effects on European regions due to the complete removal of 2005 
wool tariff barriers (percentage change) 
 France  Germ  Italy  UK 
1. Men’s worsted blend woven garments   -28.49 -27.73 -31.52 -29.74 
2. Women’s worsted blend woven garments    -29.73 -29.68 -31.05 -31.31 
3. Men’s worsted pure woven garments   -36.66  -33.45  -34.71  -35.02 
4. Women’s worsted pure woven garments    -17.74 -15.63 -15.38 -17.69 
5. Men’s worsted knitted garments 0.00  18.74  6.68  4.30 
6. Women’s worsted knitted garments  -9.64 -13.35 -12.90 -21.34 
7. Men’s woollen blend woven garments   1145.60  497.60  1635.02  1189.74 
8. Women’s woollen blend woven garments   -7.31  -2.58  -16.19  -5.10 
9. Men’s woollen pure woven garments   1101.11  483.68  1858.58  1168.20 
10. Women’s woollen pure woven garments   -13.22  -12.48  -8.58  -12.72 
11. Woollen knitted blend garments   -8.33  -6.67  -14.55  -9.33 
12. Woollen knitted pure garments    -12.01 -12.81 -19.41 -13.60 
 
  The export response observed for men’s woollen woven garments in the European 
regions is reflective of the export response in other regions; this is driven, in the main, by 
the huge increase in imports of these goods by the USA and the ROW.  The US places 
specific as well as ad valorem duties on men’s wool garments (see Chapter 4, Section 
4.3.2.1), thus the total ad valorem rate is much higher than for other wool garments.  The 
complete removal of wool import tariffs reduces the relative price of imports of men’s wool 
garments by much more than for other wool garments.  Further, men’s woollen woven 
garments are predominantly produced domestically in most regions.  So the complete 
removal of existing wool tariffs places little downward pressure on the domestic price of 
these products and leads to a large fall in the relative price of imports; a large substitution 
effect results.  Although the large expansion in imports of men’s woollen woven garments 
by the USA and ROW explains the divergent export responses for wool garments across the 
European regions, the increased imports by all regions is on a small initial flow and is 
therefore not significant. 
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6.4.2.1  Allocative efficiency losses in France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Australia 
  The reduction in recent wool tariffs improves the efficiency with which resources are 
used in the economies of all regions except Australia.  The complete removal of current 
wool tariffs reduces allocative efficiency in four regions: France, Germany, Italy, Japan and 
Australia (see table 6.11, row 6).  In section 6.3.2.1 we decomposed the allocative 
efficiency variable qnit into commodity and industry effects; the results of the 
decomposition for the complete removal of current tariff barriers are presented in table 
6.18.   
 
Table 6.18  Industry and commodity allocative efficiency effects of the complete 
removal of 2005 wool tariff barriers (percentage change) 
 France  Germ  Italy  UK  USA  Japan  China  Aust  ROW 
  (a) Commodity tax base: 
COM
i qnit  
Sheep  meat  0.01 1.18 0.22 1.64 0.12 -0.32  7.44 -0.47 -0.75 
Greasy  wools  0 0 0 0  187.55  -2.36  116.64  12.98  26.74 
Scoured  wools  0  0  0  0  -234.06 -44.40 142.89 -22.11 -13.24 
Carbon wools  32.12  12.34  6.74  46.62  -82.05 15.22  202.46  0.85 23.82 
Worsted  tops  9.52 24.22 10.03 63.37 22.26 -2.32  136.13 -9.02 31.07 
Noils 30.04  226.98  5.43  3.13  -74.62 -89.51 -22.56  -7.72  13.72 
Wool  yarns  12.55 48.99 53.15 44.85 77.28 54.69 68.57  107.25  8.36 
Wool  fabrics  198.77 179.67 159.73  214.35 25.43 17.52 49.53  0 40.12 
Wool garms  15.21  9.22  12.26  33.51 11.59  6.86 11.72 17.91 12.28 
Synth textiles  -0.04  0.00  -0.37  0.00 -0.13 -0.20  0.41 -0.12 -0.07 
Other  goods  -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05  0.29 -0.03 -0.03 
Total: 
COM qnit   -0.02 -0.02 -0.02  0.06  0.11 -0.01  0.89 -0.01  0.07 
  (b) Industry tax base: 
IND
j qnit  
Sheep    0.25 0.24 0.00 0.15 0.09 -0.05 -0.61 -0.44 -4.85 
Scoured  wools  -39.12 -51.49 -39.47  15.79 -50.10  -408.71 116.70  3.52 -10.40 
Carbon wools  -17.43  -1.17  -11.82  1.71 55.52 13.49 70.89 -1.70 -4.62 
Worsted  tops  -34.41 -32.44 -42.95 23.89  469.56  -54.63 48.90 -7.37  2.47 
Wool yarns  11.36  17.77  -0.20  -0.51 169.74 -18.53  36.47 -16.15  -414.36 
Wool fabrics  -5.72  78.61  5.31  6.79  -72.82 -5.58 47.22 -3.28  -20.61 
Wool  garms  -16.52 -40.57 -10.44  23.98  -46.55 -4.66 11.02 -2.91  7.64 
Other indust  -0.04  -0.10  0.03  -0.03  0.01  0.00 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 
Total: 
IND qnit   -0.08 -0.59  0.14 -0.02 -0.09 -0.03  0.02 -0.07 -0.03 
 
  For Australia, the allocative efficiency effects of changes in industry output from 
current wool tariffs are almost a mirror image of the effects from recent wool tariffs; 
allocative efficiency from industry output falls (–0.07%) in Australia because most of the 
industries that contract are already smaller than optimum and all the industries that expand   257
(i.e., sheep and carbonised wools) are already larger than optimum.  Nevertheless, 
allocative efficiency from commodity sales also falls marginally by –0.01%.  Allocative 
efficiency improves from increased exports of greasy wools and increased imports of wool 
garments (both taxed commodities).  But these gains are more than offset by reduced 
domestic and overseas sales of scoured wools, reduced exports of noils and reduced sales of 
the other goods composite due to the general contraction in economic activity in Australia.   
  The allocative efficiency losses in France, Germany and Japan are driven by a pattern 
similar to that observed for Australia; allocative efficiency falls from both commodity sales 
and industry output but the effects of industry output dominate.  In France, the fall in 
efficiency is mainly due to large reductions in industries that a relatively highly taxed – 
worsted tops, wool garments and other industries – and are relatively large.  In Germany, 
the loss is due to the 38% contraction in the worsted tops industries and the small 
contraction (–0.06%) in the other industries.  For Japan, the loss is driven in large part by 
the contraction (–4.7%) in the wool garments industries that, although relatively lightly 
taxed, represent the largest wool industries in Japan.   
  The allocative efficiency loss in Italy is unique in that it is purely driven by the 
change in the composition of commodity sales.  Wool garments are the most highly taxed 
imports in Italy and increase by 188% when 2005 wool tariffs are completely removed.  
This significantly improves efficiency (12%).  But this improvement is more than offset by 
reduced sales of other goods (–0.06%) – this figure includes imports as well domestically-
produced other goods.  In overall terms, other goods are the most highly taxed goods in 
Italy and the contraction of sales strongly reduces efficiency as sales of these goods are 
already smaller than optimum.   
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6.5  Sensitivity analysis 
  It is appropriate to investigate the sensitivity of the model results with respect to key 
parameters so as to assess the robustness of the results.  There are many endogenous 
variables upon which we could focus the sensitivity analysis.  To keep the analysis 
manageable, we focus on regional welfare as it summarises the overall effect for each 
region.  The sensitivity analysis consists of calculating means and standard deviations for 
the welfare effects with respect to five key parameters (elasticities): factor substitution, 
intermediate input substitution, import-domestic substitution, import source substitution, 
and output transformation.  This is done using the systematic sensitivity analysis facility 
available in GEMPACK (Arndt and Pearson 1996).   
  Table 6.19 presents the mean and standard deviations for regional welfare with 
respect to systematic variation in parameters.  In calculating means and standard deviations, 
the industry/commodity dimension of each parameter value is varied together whereas the 
regional dimension is varied independently.12  So the results concentrate on the sensitivity 
of the assumed parameter values across regions, providing information on the true range of 
regional welfare effects.   
  For recent wool tariffs (panel a), the welfare effects are robust for four regions: Italy, 
UK, China and Australia.  For these regions, the standard deviations are small relative to 
the mean indicating that (i) the sign of welfare estimate is not sensitive to variations in 
parameter values, and (ii) the size of the welfare estimate is only slightly sensitive to 
variations in parameter values.  Thus, we can be highly confident in the estimated welfare 
effects for these regions; i.e., we can be highly confident that Italy and China are the 
                                              
12 So, for instance, in testing the sensitivity of the factor substitution elasticities (table 6.19, column 2), we 
vary the parameter values together for all industries in a given region by ± 50% while maintaining the size 
of the same values in all other regions.  This requires running 18 (=2x9 regions) simulations.     259
biggest winners from changes in recent wool tariffs, the UK is a small gainer and that 
Australia is the biggest loser.   
 
Table 6.19  Mean and standard deviation of regional welfare with respect to various 
model parameters (percentage change) 












(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
 
(a) Change in recent wool tariffs: 1997–2005 
France    0.000  0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002  0.000 
Germany    0.003  0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002  0.000 
Italy    0.094  0.009 0.007 0.017 0.017  0.001 
UK    0.017  0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001  0.000 
USA -0.016  0.007 0.000 0.004 0.004  0.000 
Japan    0.002  0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001  0.000 
China    0.092  0.000 0.001 0.012 0.012  0.001 
Australia  -0.040  0.006 0.001 0.011 0.011  0.003 
ROW  -0.005  0.003 0.000 0.002 0.002  0.000 
  (b) Complete removal of 2005 wool tariffs  
France  -0.051  0.009 0.000 0.003 0.003  0.000 
Germany  -0.075  0.034 0.000 0.001 0.001  0.000 
Italy  -0.109  0.012 0.001 0.019 0.019  0.000 
UK    0.002  0.003 0.000 0.005 0.005  0.000 
USA -0.040  0.009 0.000 0.003 0.003  0.000 
Japan  -0.024  0.005 0.000 0.001 0.001  0.000 
China    0.099  0.002 0.000 0.004 0.004  0.000 
Australia  -0.051  0.007 0.001 0.005 0.005  0.001 
ROW  -0.075  0.008 0.000 0.002 0.002  0.000 
 
  The standard deviations for France, Germany and Japan indicate that the sign of the 
estimated welfare effects are not robust; the welfare effects could be either negative or 
positive depending on the chosen parameter values.  Nevertheless, the mean welfare effects 
for these regions are close to zero and the size of the standard deviations confirm that 
variations in parameter values would still provide welfare estimates of close to zero.  For 
the USA and ROW, the welfare estimates are somewhat robust; the welfare effects for 
these regions are sensitive to factor substitution and Armington parameters but insensitive 
to other elasticities.     260
  For 2005 wool tariffs [panel (b), table 6.19], the size and sign of the 0.1% welfare 
gain for China is robust, i.e., we can be highly confident that China is the biggest gainer 
from the complete removal of 2005 wool tariffs.  The sign of the welfare effect for Italy is 
robust but the size is less so; the –0.1% loss for Italy is somewhat sensitive to factor 
substitution and Armington parameter values.  The other major losers from the removal of 
2005 wool tariffs, Germany and ROW (–0.08%), have varying sensitivities to parameter 
values.  Germany’s welfare loss is very sensitive to factor substitution elasticities but 
invariant to other elasticities, whereas the ROW’s welfare loss is insensitive to all elasticity 
values.  The sensitivity results for Italy, Germany and Japan suggest that we can highly 
confident that these regions are the largest losers from the removal of 2005 wool tariffs, and 
that the individual losses are highly likely to be similar.   
  For the UK, the standard deviations indicate that the small welfare gain (0.002%) 
predicted by the benchmark scenario is not robust and could be negative, depending on the 
chosen parameter values.  Regardless, the size of the welfare effect is insensitive to 
parameter choices.  For the other losing regions – France, USA, Japan and Australia – the 
standard deviations indicate that while the size of the loss may be sensitive to parameter 
values, the sign is insensitive and these regions would likely lose under a wide range of 
parameter values.   
 
6.6  Discussion 
  Our estimates of the effects tariffs on wool products indicate that, in general, the 
economy-wide effects are small (see rows 1 and 4, table 6.20).  But for some regions the 
real income effects are comparable to recent estimates of the real income effects of an 
OECD-based trade agreement including agriculture, manufacturing and services (Francois   261
et al. 2005).13  The largest real income effects of our simulations approach 0.1% in absolute 
terms (rows 2 and 5); i.e., Italy and China for recent wool tariffs and Germany, Italy and 
China for current wool tariffs.  For China, the absolute size of our estimates are comparable 
to those by Francois et al. (2005) for an OECD-based trade round estimate where China is 
expected to suffer a real income loss in the order of 0.1% (see table 9, p.374).  Francois et 
al. (2005) also estimate a gain of 0.5% for Germany and 0.4% for the ‘Rest of EU 15’ (a 
region including Italy).  Our estimates indicate that wool tariffs have between one-quarter 
and one-fifth of the effect on real income of an OECD-based trade round for these regions.   
 
Table 6.20  Various regional effects of wool tariff liberalisation scenarios (percentage 
change) 
 France  Germ  Italy  UK  USA  Japan  China  Aust  ROW 
  (a) Change in recent wool tariffs: 1997–2005 
1. Real GDP  -0.001  -0.000  0.065  0.006 -0.015 -0.001  0.062 -0.029 -0.003 
2. Real income  0.000  0.003  0.094  0.017  -0.016 0.002 0.092  -0.040  -0.005 
3. Value added            
3a. Wool inds  -2.355  -0.990  3.264  3.141 -6.194 -1.147  0.960 -1.157 -0.499 
3b. Other inds  0.000  -0.004  0.026  -0.003 -0.019  0.002 -0.006 -0.024 -0.013 
  (b) Complete removal of 2005 wool tariffs  
4. Real GDP  -0.046  -0.064  -0.076  -0.012 -0.040 -0.020  0.048 -0.035 -0.026 
5. Real income  -0.051  -0.075  -0.109  0.002 -0.040 -0.024  0.099 -0.033 -0.013 
6 .   V a l u e   a d d e d              
6a. Wool inds  -5.450  -5.039  -4.383  5.823 -0.674 -5.564 12.818 -0.495  3.575 
6b. Other inds  -0.038  -0.061  -0.040  -0.027 -0.045 -0.003 -0.064 -0.032 -0.046 
 
  An interesting feature of the effects of recent wool tariffs is that there is no general 
pattern to the effects on the wool and nonwool economies (rows 3a and 3b, table 6.20) in 
each region.  For Italy, the wool and nonwool economies expand; for China, the wool 
economy expands but the nonwool economy contracts; for Germany, the USA, Australia 
and the ROW, both the wool and nonwool economies contract; for France and Japan, the 
nonwool economy expands at the expense of the wool economy.  In contrast,  current  wool  
                                              
13 This experiment is regarded as realistic by the authors.  It involves no actual liberalisation by developing 
countries and only involves a 50% reduction in all trade protection measures for agriculture, manufactures 
and services by OECD countries (see pp. 366–7).    262
tariffs reduce the size of both the wool and nonwool economies in most regions (rows 6a 
and 6b).  The exceptions are the UK, China and the ROW where the wool economies 
expand at the expense of the nonwool economies.   
  Italy and China experience the largest positive effects on real GDP from recent wool 
tariffs.  For Italy, recent wool tariffs provide almost no initial contractionary effect from 
lower import tariffs but provide the largest (relative to other regions) initial expansionary 
effect from lower tariff barriers on exports.  The result is a fall in relative price of capital 
and an expansion in the capital stock.  For China, the initial contractionary effect is 
comparable to the initial expansionary effect so that the capital stock does not change.  But 
the improvement in allocative efficiency from the tariff changes is so large that it increases 
real GDP by a similar amount to that observed in Italy.  The largest reductions in real GDP 
are observed for Australia and the USA.  The USA experiences a large contractionary 
effect from lower import tariffs and a small expansionary effect from lower tariff barriers 
on exports, thus the relative price of capital rises and the capital stock falls significantly.  
Australia is the only region where allocative efficiency falls due to the tariff changes.   
Allocative efficiency falls because most of the industries that contract due to the tariff 
changes are already smaller than optimum and all the industries that expand are already 
larger than optimum. 
  The set of regions that experience the largest (absolute) real GDP effects from recent 
wool tariffs are the same set of regions that experience the largest (absolute) real income 
effects; Italy, China and Australia.  But the real income effects are greater in absolute size 
than the real GDP effects for this set of regions and the reason differs for each region.  
Italy’s expanding economy increases the indirect tax base to such an extent that the 
government budget position can be maintained with a reduction in the income tax rate; a 
lower income tax rate means the gain to households, in terms of real income, is greater than   263
that for the economy in general.  The reverse occurs in Australia where the allocative 
efficiency loss reduces the indirect tax base and the income tax rate must rise to maintain a 
fixed budget position.  Households in China gain more than the economy generally as the 
consumer price index hardly rises due to a large fall in the price of wool garments from the 
tariff changes; thus, they capture almost all of the increase in factor prices.   
  All regions except China experience lower real GDP from the complete removal of 
current (2005) wool tariffs.  Comparing the relative sizes of the initial contractionary and 
expansionary effects of recent wool tariffs with current wool tariffs, China is the only 
region where the initial contractionary effect is much smaller relative to the initial 
expansionary effect; for all other regions the initial contractionary effect of current wool 
tariffs is much larger than the initial expansionary effect.  Thus, all regions except China 
experience smaller real GDP when current wool tariffs are removed.   
  With the initial contractionary effect being much smaller in China than the initial 
expansionary effect, the relative price of capital falls and the capital stock expands; the 
reverse happens in all other regions.  China also gains from a significant improvement in 
allocative efficiency.  Despite the complete removal of current wool tariffs, allocative 
efficiency falls in about half of the regions we model; France, Germany, Italy, Japan and 
Australia.  In Australia allocative efficiency from industry output falls because most of the 
industries that contract are already smaller than optimum and all the industries that expand 
are already larger than optimum.  Allocative efficiency from commodity sales also falls 
marginally as sales of lightly-taxed goods expand and sales of highly-taxed goods contract.  
The allocative efficiency losses in France, Germany and Japan are driven by a pattern 
similar to that observed for Australia; allocative efficiency falls from both commodity sales 
and industry output but the effects of industry output dominate.   264
  The pattern of industry effects of recent and current wool tariffs diverge considerably.  
The effects of changes in wool tariffs between 1997 and 2005 show extreme and divergent 
changes in industry output across regions with no general pattern.  In contrast, the complete 
removal of 2005 wool tariffs show a general pattern; wool industries in China either expand 
or are largely unaffected whereas wool industries everywhere else generally contract; these 
results are similar to those reported in Francois et al. (2005) that show an increased 
concentration of (all types of) textile and garment production in China from an OECD-
based trade liberalisation including agriculture, manufacturing and services (p. 372).  In our 
simulations, the general expansion in wool industries in China represents a unique 
interaction between the effects of cheaper imported wool inputs due to the removal of 
tariffs and increased export sales due to lower export barriers.  This is reflected by the 
expansion in domestic sales, imports and exports for most of the wool industries in China; 
thus, scale effects drive the expansions in these industries.  Tariffs on raw wool in China 
are reduced from an initial rate of around 10%; thus imports of most types of raw wool 
expand strongly.  At the same time, domestic sales of most types of raw wool increase 
significantly.  Thus, imports improve their market shares as substitution of imported for 
domestic raw wool occurs.  At the same time, exports of all forms of raw wool also expand 
strongly; but this does not reflect the removal of significant exports barriers.   
 
6.7  Concluding comments 
  This work makes a major contribution to the modelling of wool markets.  We apply a 
model containing a detailed depiction of the multistage wool production system within a 
broader economy-wide framework to estimate the direct and indirect effects of wool tariff 
barriers over two periods of interest to trade negotiators, policy makers and producers: 
1997–2005 and 2005 and beyond.     265
  The simulation results provide an indication of the degree of discrimination imposed 
by wool tariffs.  Recent (1997–2005) wool tariffs lead to positive welfare effects for most 
regions.  Nevertheless, sensitivity analysis shows that the estimated welfare gains are robust 
only for three regions: Italy (0.09%), UK (0.017%) and China (0.09%).  The welfare gains 
for Italy and China are significant given the small relative size of the wool industries in 
these regions.  The estimated welfare gain for China is similar, in absolute terms, to that 
estimated by Francois et al. (2005) for an OECD-based trade round estimate where China is 
expected to suffer a real income loss in the order of 0.1%.   
  The gains to Italy and the UK are due to little change in import tariffs but a strong 
stimulus provided to their exports of wool textiles and garments from lower tariff barriers 
in export destinations.  Tariff barriers on wool textiles and garments fall significantly over 
1997–2005 and the pattern of both China’s and Italy’s exports are more skewed towards 
these goods than in other regions.  China’s gain is totally composed of a large allocative 
efficiency improvement driven by increased sales of late-stage processed goods (i.e., wool 
yarns, fabrics and garments).  Italy also experiences an improvement in allocative 
efficiency but also gains from an increase in the use of capital due to a fall in its relative 
price that is driven by the large expansionary effect of the tariff changes. 
  Australia is predicted to be the biggest loser from recent wool tariffs (–0.04%) and 
this result is found to be robust.  The tariff changes encourage industries that are subsidised 
to expand (i.e., early-stage processing industries; scoured wools, carbonised wools, and 
worsted tops) and encourage industries that are taxed (i.e., wool yarns and fabrics, and 
other industries) to contract.  Also, the contractionary effect of the tariff changes dominates 
the expansionary effect, thus reducing the demand for primary factors and increasing the 
relative price of capital.  The use of capital falls and this adds to the loss for Australia.     266
  For the complete removal of 2005 wool tariffs, China (0.1%) and the UK (0.002%) 
are estimated to be the only winners; but the welfare gain is only robust for China.  The 
estimated welfare gain for China is 0.1%; as with current wool tariffs, the absolute size of 
this effect is comparable to the estimated welfare effect on China of an OECD-based trade 
liberalisation scenario (Francois et al. 2005).  The reason for China’s gain from 2005 wool 
tariffs is similar to the reason for its gain from 1997–2005 tariff changes; its exports are 
skewed towards wool products that have the highest tariff rates in 2005 (i.e., wool fabrics 
and garments) and their removal benefits China more than any other region.  The result is 
an allocative efficiency improvement and increase in the use of capital due to a rise in the 
demand for primary factors that reduces the relative price of capital.  
  For three losing regions – Italy (–0.11%), Germany (0.08%) and Japan (0.024%) – 
the results are robust and we can be highly confident that these regions are the largest losers 
from the complete removal of 2005 wool tariffs.  The welfare losses are driven by a fall in 
allocative efficiency due to the changes in composition of sales and output in these 
economies.  
     Underlying the welfare effects of recent and current wool tariffs are the effects on 
individual industries in each region.  The results indicate that the nature of both recent and 
current wool tariffs severely distort the size of wool industries in different regions.  For 
recent wool tariffs, the changes in the output of wool commodities are extreme reflecting 
the discriminatory nature of the tariffs.  Examples include a doubling of carbonised wools 
output in France whereas in the USA it more than halves.  Other extreme reductions also 
occur in US production of wool yarns (–74%) and wool fabrics (–75%).  The results also 
indicate a relocation of wool garments production away from France, Germany and Italy, 
largely to China and the ROW region.  For 2005 wool tariffs, production effects on wool 
processing follow a general pattern: large reductions in most regions and large expansions   267
in China.  In China the expansions are in the order of 9–50%.  There is also a major 
relocation of wool garments industries away from France, Germany and Italy to the UK, 
China and the ROW region.   
  Numerical assessments of the global effects of wider tariff (and other trade) barriers 
have a long and rich history.  Numerical assessments of the effects, global or otherwise, of 
wool tariff barriers are nonexistent.  The work presented here provides a first attempt to 
present such an assessment.  As such, it provides trade negotiators, policy makers and 
producers with an unprecedented reference point for the effects of wool tariff barriers 
within the context of wider trade negotiations.   
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Appendix  Detailed results for the change in tariff barriers between 1997–2005   269
Table A.1  Industry output (percentage change) 
  France Germ  Italy  UK  USA Japan China  Aust ROW 
1.  Sheep  0.50  0.41  0.16  0.29  0.07  0.22 -2.13 -2.59 -1.52 
2.  Scoured wool <20 microns, <56 millimetres  0 39.68 78.94  0  -78.45  0 -21.01  29.73 -22.04 
3.  Scoured wool 20-23 microns, <56 millimetres  100.57 -41.57 -76.63 176.19 -51.68  10.86  -4.31  12.57 -28.76 
4.  Scoured wool >23 microns, <56 millimetres  22.54 52.75 57.86 15.26 -84.50  1.47 -23.00 1.21 3.07 
5.  Scoured wool <20 microns , 56-65 millimetres  -6.35  -11.69  -36.57  52.44  0  -17.53  -19.55  8.47  -36.50 
6.  Scoured wool 20-23 microns, 56-65 millimetres  3.18  -15.74  -8.12  -24.06  -17.89  -20.22  -19.52  -0.86  23.44 
7.  Scoured wool >23 microns, 56-65 millimetres  -35.06  -2.63 -26.56  -9.25 -13.11 -13.59 -19.54 -24.28  9.42 
8.  Scoured wool <20 microns, >65 millimetres  -15.69 -5.76  -32.33 0  -67.41  -23.78 0 0  3.13 
9.  Scoured wool 20-23 microns, >65 millimetres  0  -1.93 -33.21  0 -34.44 -20.23 -25.09  4.65 -11.96 
10.  Scoured wool >23 microns, >65 millimetres 0  5.70  -43.82  0  0  0 -34.52 -33.57 12.68 
11.  Carbonised wool <20 microns, <56 millimetres  0 30.92 28.78  190.00  -78.45 -1.78 -8.19 31.76  -39.13 
12.  Carbonised wool 20-23 microns, <56 millimetres  105.69 -41.59 -64.92 184.69 -70.15  10.46 -17.40  26.55 -35.43 
13.  Carbonised wool >23 microns, <56 millimetres  22.41 60.99 52.47 33.92 -83.10  1.47 -23.37 14.58  -11.34 
14.  Worsted top <20 microns , 56-65 millimetres  -6.35  -11.44  -36.57  50.75  -76.15  -21.98  -19.36  18.57  -36.50 
15.  Worsted top 20-23 microns, 56-65 millimetres  -7.31  6.09  -8.13  -59.83  -21.89  -20.26  -24.79  -14.48  23.02 
16.  Worsted top >23 microns, 56-65 millimetres  -35.06  19.85 -26.56  -9.25 -41.58 -17.00 -20.68 -24.05  10.50 
17.  Worsted top <20 microns, >65 millimetres  -15.69 -5.76  -32.33 0  -67.41  -23.78 0 0  3.13 
18.  Worsted top 20-23 microns, >65 millimetres  0  -1.93 -33.21  0 -34.44 -20.26 -24.95 5.59  -13.20 
19.  Worsted top >23 microns, >65 millimetres 0  5.70  -43.83  0  0  0 -34.52 -33.57 12.68 
20.  Worsted blend yarn  -6.32  3.81  1.07  -20.81  -87.36  -13.58  -35.16  -68.29  38.80 
21.  Worsted  pure  lightweight  yarn  0 -15.73 -32.40  12.17 -67.20 -24.51 -26.72 -79.12  4.68 
22.  Worsted pure heavyweight yarn  0.75  10.82  12.61  -18.19  0.32  -28.15  -29.65  -68.18  -8.83 
23.  Woollen blend yarn  23.96  4.10  14.15  95.95  -80.87  40.64  -27.19  -4.12  -57.56 
24.  Woollen pure yarn  23.20  14.03  36.09  197.66  -74.08  3.77  -28.73  -2.25  -38.77 
25.  Worsted blend woven fabric  -13.01  16.39  1.17  1.86 -88.07 -11.90  43.61 -67.84 -30.97 
26.  Worsted pure lightweight woven fabric  -14.32  -9.94 -12.61 -19.04 -27.65  -9.04 394.00 -67.95 320.96 
27.  Worsted pure heavyweight woven fabric  -1.84 23.54 19.25 11.97  0.87  -10.92 51.74  -67.35  -44.68 
28.  Worsted knitted fabric  -2.99  0  1.85 16.63 90.43 -3.79 14.96 -67.48 -14.43 
29.  Woollen blend woven fabric  55.97 56.38 43.61 89.22  -83.99 36.89 -8.09 -2.24  -35.18 
30.  Woollen pure woven fabric  58.22  82.01  95.22  184.03  -75.28  2.05  -30.87  -1.80  -45.00 
31.  Synthetics  -29.66 -28.59 -12.96 -25.67  68.30 -20.16 -25.23 -68.96  17.04 
32.  Men’s worsted blend woven garments   -16.03  -23.58  -9.50  -23.50  73.40  -13.63  1.09  -67.09  29.87 
33.  Women’s worsted blend woven garments   -38.29  -37.11 -20.64 -30.86  -6.68 -34.30  2.96 -66.70  14.31 
34.  Men’s worsted pure woven garments   -13.57  -16.38  -8.80  -19.12  21.43  -12.51  28.50  -67.94  44.40 
35.  Women’s worsted pure woven garments   0  3.32  -0.83  -8.60  0.00  -1.38  -46.59  -68.82  41.92 
36.  Men’s worsted knitted garments  -23.42  -24.92  -9.64  -19.59  -93.47  -5.23  30.54  -65.86  21.68 
37.  Women’s worsted knitted garments  1.85  -0.18 1.06 0.67  -0.29  -0.03 1.57  -1.12 0.30 
38.  Men’s woollen blend woven garments   -13.46  -23.03  -5.92 -16.23 -71.58 -16.20  25.04 -65.71  8.12 
39.  Womens’ woollen blend woven garments    1.46  -0.34 8.89 5.60  -0.01  -0.01 1.12  -0.89 0.18 
40.  Men’s woollen pure woven garments   -20.63  -23.83  -18.25  -18.98  -83.42  -11.23  15.48  -59.67  7.34 
41.  Womens’ woollen pure woven garments   -6.96  -10.82 -10.47  -6.85  9.17  9.51  -0.27 -40.40  19.77 
42.  Woollen knitted blend garments    -14.57 -14.89 -18.72 -8.91 10.80  -18.32 5.80  -32.00  15.84 
43.  Woollen knitted pure garments    0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00  -0.02  0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
44.  Other  goods  0.50  0.41  0.16  0.29  0.07  0.22 -2.13 -2.59 -1.52   270
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  The core objective of this thesis is to aid understanding of the economic mechanisms 
by which the world wool market operates.  In doing so, we have analysed two issues –
productivity and trade – and their effect on the world wool market and its submarkets.  In 
performing the analysis we have developed a novel analytical framework.  The framework 
combines two long and rich modelling traditions: the partial-equilibrium commodity-
specific approach and the computable-general-equilibrium approach.  The result is a model 
that represents the world wool market in detail, tracking the production of greasy wool 
through five off-farm production stages that end in the production of wool garments.   
Capturing the multistage nature of the wool production system is a key pillar in this part of 
the model.  At the same time, the rest of the economy, or nonwool economy, is represented 
through six representative agents: nonwool producers, capital creators, households, 
exporters, governments and importers.   
  We first apply the model to analysing the relationship between productivity changes 
and grower incomes.  Here, we examine the relationship between grower incomes and on- 
and off-farm productivity changes.  The analysis indicates that the nature of the assumed 
supply shift from research is crucial in estimating returns to wool growers from 
productivity improvements.  Assuming a degree of research leakage to foreign producers, a 
pivotal supply shift will reduce quasi-rents to Australian wool producers for both on- and 
off-farm research, in both the short and long run; the losses are largest from on-farm 
research.  Again assuming a degree of research leakage to foreign producers, a parallel   274
supply shift will increase quasi-rents to Australian wool producers for both on- and off-
farm research, in both the short and long run; the gains are largest from on-farm research.   
  The results are as predicted by economic theory when it is assumed that the producer 
faces inelastic demand; our model assumes inelastic demand for sheep meat and wool 
garments.  Extensive sensitivity analysis confirms that the assumed nature of the supply 
shift is the important determinant of the sign of the welfare effects from research.  Previous 
studies have modelled research as a parallel supply shift, e.g., Freebairn et al. (1982), 
Mullen et al. (1989), following the argument made by Rose (1980) in favour of using a 
parallel supply shift as the best approximation.  As such, we believe it is appropriate to 
place more weight on the estimates generated by assuming a parallel supply shift.   
  Focussing on estimates generated from parallel supply shifts, we find that on-farm 
research is to be preferred to all other forms of research; on-farm research gives the largest 
welfare gain to Australian wool producers and off-farm research ranks second.  The result 
is consistent with the only empirical study that has addressed this issue, Mullen et al. 
(1989).  Unlike Mullen et al. (1989), our model is comprehensive enough to assess research 
in five off-farm production stages; this compares to two off-farm productions stages for 
Mullen et al. (1989).  Our results indicate that, in general, off-farm research that is ‘close’ 
to the wool producer provides larger benefits than off-farm research that is ‘distant’.  This 
contrasts with the off-farm research findings by Mullen et al. (1989) who find that top 
processing research provides smaller benefits than textile research.  The comprehensive 
model applied here suggests such a ranking is unlikely when off-farm production stages are 
modelled as separate industries and research is applied as a technological improvement.  
The result by Mullen et al. (1989) is driven by modelling textile research as an exogenous 
increase in demand by the top industry.     275
  Extensive sensitivity analysis indicates that certain assumptions do affect the 
estimated welfare gains from research.  We evaluate the price/income elasticities for final 
demand, wool/nonwool input substitution, factor substitution by the sheep industry, trade 
elasticities, and the degree of research leakage from Australia to foreign producers.  None 
of these assumptions are found to alter the ranking of benefits from on- and off-farm 
research.  Nevertheless, some assumptions are found to have a noticeable impact on the 
estimated research gains.  Trade elasticities are most important as they affect the top three 
ranked forms of research: on-farm, scouring, and carding/combing.  Factor substitution by 
the sheep industry is also important for on-farm research gains, but less so for scouring and 
carding/combing research.  The degree of research leakage is found to be important only 
for on-farm research gains.  Price/income elasticities are also found to be important only for 
estimating gains from garment-making research.  Wool/nonwool input substitution is found 
to be relatively unimportant for research in all production stages.   
  Our base case scenario indicates that there are significant benefits to Australian wool 
producers from on-farm research: a 1% improvement in on-farm productivity increases 
welfare by around 1.4%.  Off-farm research provides smaller benefits: a 1% improvement 
in scouring productivity increases welfare by around 0.7%, and a 1% improvement in 
carding/combing productivity increases welfare by around 0.6%.  The results suggest a 
number of policy implications.  On-farm levy-funded research is to be preferred by the 
Australian wool grower over off-farm research.  To the extent that off-farm research is 
undertaken, scouring and carding/combing research is to be preferred to later-stage off-farm 
research.  On-farm research that is specific to Australian conditions is to be preferred, as 
the less applicable the research is to foreign producers the greater will be the gains to 
Australian producers.     276
  Next we apply the model to analysing the economic effects of wool tariff changes.  
Changes in recent wool tariffs (the period 1997–2005) lead to positive welfare effects for 
most regions.  Nevertheless, sensitivity analysis shows that the estimated welfare gains are 
robust only for three regions: Italy (0.09%), UK (0.017%) and China (0.09%).  The welfare 
gains for Italy and China are significant given the small relative size of the wool industries 
in these regions.   
  The gains to Italy and the UK are due to little change in import tariffs but a strong 
stimulus provided to their exports of wool textiles and garments from lower tariff barriers 
in export destinations.  Tariff barriers on wool textiles and garments fall significantly over 
1997–2005 and the pattern of both China’s and Italy’s exports are more skewed towards 
these goods than in other regions.  China’s gain is totally composed of a large allocative 
efficiency improvement driven by increased sales of late-stage processed goods (i.e., wool 
yarns, fabrics and garments).  Italy also experiences an improvement in allocative 
efficiency but also gains from an increase in the use of capital due to a fall in its relative 
price that is driven by the large expansionary effect of the tariff changes. 
  Australia is predicted to be the biggest loser from recent wool tariffs (–0.04%) and 
this result is found to be robust.  The tariff changes encourage industries that are subsidised 
to expand (i.e., early-stage processing industries; scoured wool, carbonised wool, and 
worsted tops) and encourage industries that are taxed (i.e., wool yarns and fabrics, and 
other industries) to contract.  Also, the contractionary effect of the tariff changes dominates 
the expansionary effect, thus reducing the demand for primary factors and increasing the 
relative price of capital.  The use of capital falls and this adds to the loss for Australia.   
  For the complete removal of 2005 wool tariffs, China (0.1%) and the UK (0.002%) 
are estimated to be the only winners; but the welfare gain is only robust for China.  The 
reason for China’s gain from 2005 wool tariffs is similar to the reason for its gain from   277
1997–2005 tariff changes; its exports are skewed towards wool products that have the 
highest tariff rates in 2005 (i.e., wool fabrics and garments) and their removal benefits 
China more than any other region.  The result is an allocative efficiency improvement and 
increase in the use of capital due to a rise in the demand for primary factors that reduces the 
relative price of capital.  
  For three losing regions – Italy (–0.11%), Germany (–0.08%) and Japan (–0.024%) – 
the results are robust and we can be highly confident that these regions are the largest losers 
from the complete removal of 2005 wool tariffs.  The welfare losses are driven by a fall in 
allocative efficiency due to the changes in composition of sales and output in these 
economies.  
     Underlying the welfare effects of recent and current wool tariffs are the effects on 
individual industries in each region.  The results indicate that the nature of both recent and 
current wool tariffs severely distort the size of wool industries across regions.  For recent 
wool tariffs, the changes in the output of wool commodities are extreme reflecting the 
discriminatory nature of the tariffs.  Examples include a doubling of carbonised wools 
output in France whereas in the USA it more than halves.  Other extreme reductions also 
occur in US production of wool yarns (–74%) and wool fabrics (–75%).  The results also 
indicate a relocation of wool garments production away from France, Germany and Italy, 
largely to China and the ROW region.  For the complete removal of 2005 wool tariffs, 
production effects on wool processing follow a general pattern: large reductions in most 
regions and large expansions in China.  In China the expansions are in the order of 9–50%.  
There is also a major relocation of wool garments industries away from France, Germany 
and Italy to the UK, China and the ROW region.   
  Numerical assessments of the global effects of wider tariff (and other trade) barriers 
have a long and rich history.  Numerical assessments of the effects, global or otherwise, of   278
wool tariff barriers are nonexistent.  The work presented here provides a first attempt to 
present such an assessment.  As such, it provides trade negotiators, policy makers and 
producers with an unprecedented reference point for the effects of wool tariff barriers 
within the context of wider trade negotiations.   
  The overall finding of this work is that a sophisticated analytical framework is 
necessary for analysing productivity and trade issues in the world wool market.  Only a 
model of this kind can appropriately handle the degree of complexity of interactions 
between members (domestic and foreign) of the multistage wool production system.   
Further, including the nonwool economy in the analytical framework allows us to capture 
the indirect effects of changes in the world wool market and also the effects on the nonwool 
economy itself.  The results from the wool trade liberalisation scenarios indicate no 
consistent pattern across regions of nonwool economy effects; i.e., sometimes the nonwool 
economy expands, sometimes it contracts, and the effect is not consistent with changes in 
economy overall.   
  The results from the wool trade liberalisation scenarios also show that even though 
the world wool market is small, both globally and for most regions, the results for some 
regions may approach the order of magnitude of wider multilateral liberalisation on all 
goods and services.  For instance, the estimated welfare gain for China from recent and 
current wool tariffs is around 0.1%.  The absolute size of this effect is comparable to the 
estimated welfare effect on China of an OECD-based trade liberalisation scenario (Francois 
et al. 2005).  This result could not be observed using a model that was partial equilibrium 
and ignored the rest of the economy.   
  The work here demonstrates the merits of synthesising the partial-equilibrium 
commodity-specific approach with the computable-general-equilibrium approach in 
modelling a specific commodity market and its submarkets.  As such, consideration should   279
be given to applying such an approach in modelling other commodity markets and that the 
extra benefit of undertaking such an approach may exceed the extra cost.  Ignoring the 
possible cost-benefit ratio, there are no technical barriers to applying the approach to 
modelling commodities other than wool and its derivatives. 
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